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Appendix A: Supplemental Information
This is the online Appendix to the Letter Tactical Extremism, in the American Political
Science Review. This version of the online Appendix is from September 14th, 2018.
This online Appendix contains the following ve sections.
1. An extended literature review.
2. Motivating historical examples.
3. Formal notation and denitions.
4. Formal statement and proofs of the results in the Letter.
5. Extensions.
1. Extended Literature Review
Following the Great Recession, concerns about political extremism have made understanding
its causes and evolution a salient priority in political research.
Motivated by the rise of previously fringe parties in Europe, a branch of the literature
on extremism analyzes the rise of outsider candidates (Buisseret and van Weelden 2017;
Karakas 2017) and populist parties (Guiso, Herrera, Morelli and Sono 2017). Our work
belongs instead to a literature that studies why mainstream parties sometimes also choose
extremist (or at least non-median) policies.
A large strand within this latter literature explains policy divergence as a consequence
of partiespolicy preferences. Parties with policy preferences choose non-median policies
if there is su¢ cient uncertainty about voters preferences (Wittman 1983; Calvert 1985;
Roemer 1994; Matakos, Troumpounis and Xefteris 2016), or if candidates cannot commit
to a platform (Osborne and Slivinski 1996; Besley and Coate 1997; Aragonès, Palfrey and
Postlewaite 2007; Kalandrakis 2009; Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin 2013; van Weelden 2013).
One may wonder whether parties that are purely o¢ ce motivated ever choose extremist
policies in their pursuit of o¢ ce. O¢ ce motivated parties may choose non-median positions
if they do not know the location of the median voter (Bernhardt, Duggan and Squintani,
2009b). Even if they know the location of the median, they may choose non-median po-
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sitions to prevent third-party entry (Palfrey 1984), or to change voters ideologies (Prato
2018). Parties may also tactically announce extreme platforms if their announcements are
discounted by voters (Grofman 1985; Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012), so that an extreme
announcement is needed to signal a moderate policy.
Valence di¤erences across parties help us predict which party is likely to adopt extreme
policies. The classical notion of valence is a party specic attribute that makes the party
more appealing to all voters, as if it were a quality dimension (Stokes 1992). Theories that
focus on o¢ ce motivated parties and on the role of valence di¤erences tend to nd that
the stronger party adopts a more mainstream policy than the weaker one (Ansolabehere
and Snyder 2000, Groseclose 2001). Assuming such party valences, Aragonès and Palfrey
(2002, 2004), and Moon (2004), show that a weak candidate moves away from the center
and chooses policy stochastically, to di¤erentiate itself from a stronger rival.
Soubeyran (2009) and Krasa and Polborn (2010) independently introduce the notion of
policy-specic party valence. A policy-specic party valence is a quality attribute that a
party holds but it is specic for a particular policy: the party is good at something in par-
ticular, not good in general. In the context of a theory of public good provision, Soubeyran
(2009) and Krasa and Polborn (2010) assume that candidates di¤er in their competences
to provide each one of two public goods, and they compete by choosing quantities of pro-
duction of each good. They nd that candidates specialize, proposing to provide a greater
quantity of the good in which they are more competent. Krasa and Polborn (2012) consider
a theory of electoral competition with very general voter preferences, which can depend on
the xed attributes of candidates, on policy choices, and on the interaction of attributes and
policies. They nd conditions on voter preferences that lead to policy convergence, or to
policy divergence. Namely, if preferences satisfy a weak separability condition (called uni-
form candidate ranking) between attributes and policies, then in any strict equilibrium,
candidatespolicies converge. Whereas, complementarities between attributes and policies
lead to violations of this separability condition, and to policy divergence.
Krasa and Polborn (2014) apply a fusion of their di¤erentiated candidates theories
(2010 and 2012) to taxation. A candidate R has an (exogenous) competence advantage in
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providing low levels of taxation, and a candidate D has a similar (exogenous) advantage
in providing high levels of taxation. Candidates choose tax rates. In equilibrium, policies
diverge, and Candidate D proposes a higher level of taxation.
All these valence theories, whether it a global valence di¤erence (Aragonès and Palfrey
2002 and 2004; Moon 2004), or a policy-specic valence di¤erence (Soubeyran 2009; Krasa
and Polborn 2010, 2012 and 2014) explain policy divergence, but in every equilibrium of any
of these theories, each party chooses the policy that maximizes its probability of winning
the election, or its vote share. While there is policy divergence, policy proposals are not too
extreme, in the sense that each party chooses policy so as to maximize its appeal to voters.
We are interested in a more puzzling form of extremism: why would a party that can win
(with some probability) by choosing a centrist policy, ever choose to lurch to a platform so
extreme that it reduces the partys probability of winning? Why would an o¢ ce-motivated
party ever go against the wishes of its electorate, defying its voters with a proposal that voters
do not want and most voters will not vote for? In any static theory (such as Aragonès and
Palfrey 2002 and 2004; Moon 2004; Soubeyran 2009; and Krasa and Polborn 2010, 2012 and
2014) a party that is exclusively o¢ ce-motivated must by denition maximize its probability
of winning the election, so choosing such an extreme policy that reduces its probability of
winning cannot be optimal. Nevertheless, parties sometimes do choose to run an electoral
campaign on a platform that is so extreme that it reduces the partys chances of winning
the election (see our motivating examples in the next section). To explain these choices, we
need a dynamic theory.
We explain why an exclusively o¢ ce-motivated party sometimes chooses such an extreme
policy by introducing dynamic considerations and endogenous valences. In Soubeyran (2009)
and Krasa and Polborn (2010, 2012 and 2014), policy-specic competence advantages are
exogenous, and candidatespolicies diverge because each candidate proposes the policy shes
good at. In contrast, we assume that parties endogenously acquire (or lose) policy-specic
valences over time. Policies choices that are extremein the sense that they lead to a strictly
lower probability of winning in the current election are chosen because they help accumulate
policy-specic valence to increase the probability of winning future elections. We call this
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choice tactical extremism.A party that cares about future elections, may regard losing
the current election with an extreme platform as an investment that helps the party build
its reputation to win a future election. This intuition is key to our theory.
Endogenous non-policy party valences had been considered by Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita (2009) and Serra (2010). Hirsch and Shotts (2015) endogenize policy-specic va-
lence: candidates choose a policy position, and also make productive investments in the
quality of their policy. While we do not explicitly model these investments, we follow Hirsch
and Shotts (2015) in letting policy-specic valence be determined by partiesactions: we
assume that a higher quality (relative to the opponents quality) on a given policy comes
through the expertise acquired by sticking with that policy repeatedly over time and specif-
ically for more than one election cycle.6
A party that rst gains a competence advantage on a given policy position owns it, in
the sense of Petrocik (1996) and Egan (2013). A party that is weak on a particular policy
cannot match the reputation of the strong party by merely matching its policy: if a party
mimics the policy of a party that has pre-existing competence advantage, voters prefer the
authentic version to the imitation. For instance, A Democrats promise to attack crime
by hiring more police, building more prisons and punishing with longer sentences would too
easily be trumped by greater GOP enthusiasm for such solutions.(Petrocik 1996, page 826).
We introduce an initial asymmetry so that one party (perhaps due to past history of
play outside the model) has an exogenous competence disadvantage on the policy position
preferred by a representative voter. We show that the party chooses an alternative position
to develop a competence advantage on this alternative position. In Extension 5.2 below,
we microfound this initial asymmetry, by introducing partiesabilities as unobserved types:
as in Dewan and Hortala-Vallve (2017), the incumbents success or failure in o¢ ce sends a
signal about her ability, and this signal generates an asymmetry on perceived competence
over the implemented policy.
6A party cannot gain expertise suddenly, just by announcing a policy. Rather, crafting a high quality
proposal requires time: to rst draft a preliminary proposal; to let think-tanks and public policy centers
evaluate it; to hire experts to revise and improve it; to explain it to the party so that all members embrace
it; to rene how best to communicate it to the public; and to repeat the same message consistently for years
so that voters nd the party credible on this policy.
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We obtain results on the welfare e¤ects of tactical extremism. These results relate to
previous studies on whether policy polarization and extremism are detrimental or benecial
to voters. In a multidimensional model, Nunnari and Zapal (2017) di¤erentiate between
antagonism (the degree of policy di¤erentiation between parties), and extremism(the
distance between a partys position and the median voter). They show that antagonism is
benecial but extremism is detrimental to voters.
In a Calvert-Wittman model with policy-motivated parties and uncertainty about the lo-
cation of the median voter, Bernhardt, Duggan and Squintani (2009) show that the resulting
platform divergence is welfare-enhancing for voters as it insures them by giving them more
choice. Our theory yields related welfare implications: tactical extremism benets voters
if they are not too condent about the mainstream platform. Voters who currently prefer
the mainstream, but are unsure about their future policy preferences are better o¤ if parties
diversify their o¤erings so that one of them invests in developing a high quality alternative
that the voter could choose in the future.
2. Motivating Historical Examples
We describe the political context and aftermath of three instances in which mainstream
parties chose to contest a general election under an extreme leader and platform: the US
Republican party under Goldwater in 1964, the UK Labour party under Foot in 1983, and
the UK Labour party under Corbyn in 2015.
2.1. The US Republican Party under Goldwater in 1964. Tactical Extremism
Succeeds
After the United States resorted to expensive government-run programs to overcome the
Great Depression and to win World War II, the 1950s represented a rare period of consensus
around the ideas of liberal interventionism in the US. The onset of the Great Depression
during the presidency of Herbert Hoover (1929-1933) discredited conservative Republicanism
in the popular mind (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016, page 80). A moderate bloc of Re-
publicans, led by Governor Dewey of New York, gradually came to accept that the modern
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economy required government intervention(Richardson 2014, page 204). Under President
Eisenhower (19531960), the GOP stopped ghting against the modern welfare state.
However, this ideological concession put the Republican party at a disadvantage: as long
as the political contest was about who is best qualied to lead big government programs,
the Democratic party, with its Franklin D. Roosevelts New Deal legacy, had the upper
hand over a Republican party that had only reluctantly made peace with the very idea of
government interventions. With the exception of Eisenhowers reelection in 1956, Republican
electoral defeats accumulated: in midterm elections in 1954 (in which the GOP lost its Senate
majority), 1958, and 1962, and in the 1960 presidential elections. By 1963, Democrats
controlled the Presidency, had a veto-proof majority of 68 to 32 in the Senate, and a majority
of 258 to 176 in the House. As noted by Hofstadter in 1964: So long as the Republican
moderates are committed to keeping their party in the American mainstream, they have had
little to o¤er but a choice that is only an echo.
Dissatised conservatives did not want to keep the GOP as a copycat party. Instead,
they sought to shatter the liberal consensus and to o¤er a conservative alternative. If in
1950 Trilling could write that in the United States at this time liberalism is not only the
dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition, in 1960, Barry Goldwaters Conscience of
a Conservative sought to pull the Republican party away from this mainstream and to return
it to conservatism: We cannot win as a dime-store copy of the oppositions platform [...]
We must be di¤erent(Perlstein 2001, page 137). Goldwater, with a DW-Nominate score
of 0.64, was the second most conservative senator in the 88th Congress (1963-64). In 1964 he
became the GOP presidential candidate, and in his convention speech declared: extremism
in the defense of liberty is no vice.
The electorate rejected this extremism and Goldwater lost in a landslide. However,
conservative leaders had anticipated this loss, and viewed it as an investment. Back in 1963,
Goldwater had spoken favorably about running, even in a losing race, in order to advance
the conservative cause (Perlstein 2001, page 200). Campaigning for Goldwater, William F.
Buckley argued that the campaign was destined to lose, and that its purpose was to win
recruits for future Novembers: to infuse the conservative spirit in enough people to entitle
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us to look about us. . . not at the ashes of defeat, but at the well planted seeds of hope, which
will ower on a great November date in the future.7
These conservative seeds planted by the Goldwater 1964 campaign owered indeed, and
they bore fruit: What appeared to be a defeat for conservatives was actually a dramatic
success: [...] Out of the ruins of the 1964 campaign emerged a well-organized, experienced
movement.8 This movement went on to win local and state races, House and Senate seats,
and governorships in the late 1960s and 70s. Most notably, Ronald Reagan rst gained
national exposure working in the 1964 campaign, and then defeated a Democratic incumbent
in 1966 to become Governor of California, and another in 1980 to become US President.
Goldwater lost 44 states, but he won the future(Edwards 2014).9 Support for liberalism
dropped sharply after 1964-65: the mass of voters who self-identied as liberals shrunk
by a quarter, never to recover in the next four decades (Ellis and Stimson 2009). Small
government conservativism became part of the American political mainstream, and it has
been at the heart of every GOP campaign platform since 1980.
2.2. The UK Labour Party under Foot in 1983. Tactical Extremism Fails
The Labour party had won the 1974 election under Harold Wilson, a moderate member
of the so called soft-leftof Labour. An economic crisis hit, and GDP per capita growth,
which had uctuated between 2% and 6.5% for the previous decade, fell to -2.5% in 1974 and
-1.5% in 1975. In March 1976, Wilson resigned, to be replaced by the new Labour leader,
James Callaghan. Callaghans ght against the Trade Union Congress over anti-inationary
measures led to widespread strikes during the winter of discontentof 1978-79. A motion
of no-condence triggered a general election in 1979, which Labour lost to the Conservatives
under Margaret Thatcher.
According to Labour MP Golding, the hard-leftand its leader Tony Benn, hoped that
7Speech at the Annual Convention of Young Americans for Freedom, September 11th, 1964.
8Matthew Dalek. The Conservative 1960s.The Atlantic Monthly. 276.6: 130-135 (December 1995).
For a more thorough analysis of the build-up and legacy of the conservative movement built around the
Goldwater campaign, see Brennan (2000).
9Paraphrasing George F. Will. The Cheerful Malcontent.Washington Post. Sunday, May 31, 1998;
Page C07.
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Thatcher would upset the people with her reactionary policies, and provide the scenario
whereby he [Benn] would emerge as the great left leader that the people were looking for.
(Golding and Farrelly 2003, page 20). Following Labours 1979 defeat, Michael Foot was
elected leader, and Labours 1983 general election manifesto lurched to hard-left positions.
Labour MP Gerald Kaufman described this party platform as the longest suicide note in
history. It led to Labours most decisive defeat since 1945. Yet, following this defeat,
Labours hard-left still believed in the strategy of persuading voters to vote for an extremist
platform against future policy failures by the Thatcher government. Benn wrote: ...the 1983
Labour manifesto commanded the loyalty of millions of voters and a democratic socialist
bridgehead has been established from which further advances in public understanding and
support can be made.10
Following the 1983 defeat, Neil Kinnock replaced Foot as Labour leader. Against a
background of strong economic growth, public opinion remained su¢ ciently supportive of
the Conservative government during Thatchers second term; Labours bet on extremism
had failed. After another electoral defeat in 1987, Kinnock began a sharp policy shift to the
center, which led to a much more narrow defeat in 1992, and nally to victory in 1997 under
Tony Blair.11
2.3. The UK Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn in 2015. Tactical Extremism
in Progress
Tony Blair led the Labour party to large victories in the 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections under
the slogan New Labour,which emphasized the partys moderation, breaking away from
its more socialist tradition. In 2007, Gordon Brown, who had served as Chancellor of the
Exchequer from 1997 to 2007, replaced Blair as Prime Minister. Almost immediately, the
UK entered its greatest recession in living memory: GDP per capita growth was -1.3% in
2008 and -4.9% in 2009.12 Labours reputation for competence in managing the economy
10Source for both quotes: The Spirit of Labour Rebornby Tony Benn, in The Guardian, 20/06/1983.
Read more about Labours strategy in the early 1980s in Wickham-Jones (1996).
11For an analysis of Labours transition to New Labour, see Heath et al. (2001, Chapter 6).
12Data: World Bank at data.worldbank.org.
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su¤ered, the party lost the 2010 election, earning only 258 seats (68 shy of a majority),
and Brown resigned.13 Ed Miliband, another moderate and former minister in Blair and
Browns cabinets, emerged as new leader. Voters continued to distrust Labours competence
throughout Milibands tenure as leader,14 and after Labour contested the 2015 election on
platform similar to the one in 2010, it lost again, its group reduced to 232 seats.15
Following these two defeats, and with the Conservative advantage in trust in managing
the economy unabated, Labour elected its most extreme-left Member of Parliament, Jeremy
Corbyn, as new party leader. Corbyn had been the most rebellious MP during Gordon
Browns 2007-2010 Labour government, as measured by dissent votes against the party
line (Cowley and Stuart 2014, Table 3), but he earned the strong backing from Unite (the
UKs largest trade union) and other unions. The 2nd most rebellious MP, John McDonnell,
became Shadow Chancellor. Both Corbyn and McDonnell belonged to the hard-left Socialist
Campaign Group at the time Corbyn was rst elected party leader in 2015.16
Labour soon went on to su¤er heavy losses of seats in the Scottish Parliament, the
Welsh Assembly and local and council elections in 2016 and 2017.17 In 2017 its electoral
prospects became so poor that the UKs Conservative government called an early election,
anticipating a much larger majority.18 After the Conservatives ran a poor campaign, Labour
beat expectations at the election but lost, earning 262 seats, 55 fewer than the Conservatives.
13Later, Labour politicians openly discussed how the party had lost the voterstrust on the economy during
Browns government. In 2014, Chuka Umunna (Shadow Business Secretary at the time) said that: the seeds
were sown under the last government and Gordon [Brown]... gave the impression we didnt understand that
debt and decit would have to be dealt with.(Source: quoted in Nicholas Brown Gordon Brown blamed for
Labours lost credibility on economy, The Guardian, 1st of September 2014).
14Source: Tom Clark. Voters trust Cameron-Osborne most with the economy, poll nds.The Guardian,
6 Oct 2014.
15That the 2010 and 2015 manifestos were similar is not surprising, given that Ed Miliband had been
assigned by Gordon Brown to draft the 2010 manifesto. (Source: Christopher Hope General Election 2010:
How Labours campaign manifesto took shape.The Telegraph, 12th April 2010).
16A YouGov poll estimated that Corbyn was perceived by voters as twice as left-wing as Ed Miliband.
Source: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/09/29/jeremy-corbyn-twice-left-wing-ed-miliband
17It recorded a net loss of 13 out of 37 defending seats, and 30% of its vote share in the Scottish election;
1 out of 30 seats and 16% of its vote share in the Welsh one; and control of 7 out of the 74 councils and 400
out of 2878 council seats in the local elections.
18On the date the election was called (April 18th, 2017), according to Britain Electss average poll tracker,
Labours party polling stood at 26%, the Conservatives at 42%. Betting house William Hill o¤ered odds of
14/1 for Labour to win most seats. During the campaign, the betting markets priced the number of Labour
seats between 162 and 210 (source: James Moore, If you want to know who will win the election, follow
the bookies.The Independent, June 6th, 2017).
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This result was almost identical to Labours 2010 defeat, which led Brown to resign as party
leader four days after the election. Yet, notwithstanding it all, Corbyn remained party leader,
presumably to lead Labour into the 2022 election. Indeed, at the beginning of the campaign,
the leader of Unite (Len McCluskey) had predicted a large defeat and pledged to continue
supporting Corbyn after such defeat.19
While the standard Downsian rationale argues that only moderate platforms lead to
victory, ...lefties have the inverse policy strategy: if you are losing, you need a more dif-
ferentiated, passionate policy vision to win.And if this passionate policy does not lead to
victory today, it will tomorrow: [Corbyn] regards himself as a soldier in a longer ght. The
Bolsheviks were this. It was about being there when the end comes, capitalism unravels, and
the envelope opens.20
As of summer 2018, Corbyn is still the leader of the Labour party, the two main parties
are close in the polls and Theresa Mays Conservative government faces the exceptional
uncertainty surrounding Brexit, making it conceivable that the lefts tactical gamble could
prove successful.
We highlight three patterns common to these three examples: First, a party with a
weak reputation on mainstream policies chooses extremism after having contested (and lost)
the most recent elections on a moderate platform. Second, choosing extremism leads to a
landslide loss in the short term. And third, those responsible for choosing extremism have
a longer horizon in mind. In the case of the GOP in 1964, extremism paid o¤ in long-term
success. In the case of Labour in 1983, it decisively did not. In the case of Labour in 2015,
it is too soon to tell.
In all three of these examples, actors have policy motivations, which parties dont have
in our model. Introducing such policy concerns would only make it easier to explain extrem-
ism. We show that extremism can arise as tactic even in the hardest case in which policy
19Source: Jessica Elgot. Success for Labour party would be 200 seats, says Len McCluskey The
Guardian. 16th May, 2017.
20The rst quote is excerpted from Pete Davis, How to Heal the Left-Liberal Divide, Current A¤airs,
October 4th, 2017. The second quote is attributed to a Miliband adviser, excerpted from Sam Knight, Enter
Left, The New Yorker, May 23rd, 2016.
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considerations are absent. All three examples show that short-term and long-term electoral
considerations were indeed quite prominent in the debate about the merits of extremism. In
order for a party as a whole to embrace the extreme factions policies, pivotal actors within
the party must believe that such policies can, in the long run, lead to electoral success.
3. Formal Notation and Denitions
Let fj; jg = fA;Dg so for any party j 2 fA;Dg; we use notation  j to refer to the other
party. Recall the policy space is fe;mg:21
Given the party platforms pair (xAt ; x
D
t ) in period t; let xt  (xAt ; xDt ); and let xj  (xj1; xj2)
and x  (x1;x2): Let the policy implemented in period t be denoted by xwt 2 fe;mg (note
that xwt = x
Wt
t ): For each j 2 fA;Dg and for each t 2 f1; 2g; xwt = xjt if the voter votes j in
period t; and if the voter abstains, then xwt is x
A
t or x
D
t with equal probability.
We denote by ot 2 f0; 1g the realized economic outcome in period t: The probability that
the economic outcome is good (ot = 1) depends on the state of Nature and the implemented
policy as follows:
Pr[ot = 1jxwt ; ] =
8<: l if xwt 6= ,h if xwt = : :
With the remaining probability, ot = 0: Outcome ot is a random variable. A belief about  is
a subjective probability Pr[ = m]: For any such belief ^ 2 [0; 1]; and for any implemented
policy xwt 2 fe;mg; we denote by E[otj(xwt ; ^)] the expectation over ot; given belief ^ and
policy xwt :
Given our assumption that party As platform in the rst period is m; a pure strategy
sA : X   1
4
; 1
4
fA;Dgf0; 1g  ! X for party A is a platform in period 2 as a function
of xD1 ; "1; W1; and o1: For party D; a strategy s
D is a pair (sD1 ; s
D
2 ); where s
D
1 2 X is an
unconditional choice of platform, and sD2 : X
 1
4
; 1
4
fA;Dgf0; 1g  ! X is a platform
in period 2 as a function of xD1 ; "1; W1 and o1:
For the voter, a strategy sv is a pair (sv1; s
v
2); where s
v
1 : X 
 1
4
; 1
4
  ! fA;D; ;g
21An alternative formulation of our model in which candidates can choose any policy over the real line, is
available from the authors upon request. Since a reduced policy space fe;mg su¢ ces to convey our results,
we choose the simplest formulation.
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is a party choice in period 1 as a function of xD1 and the non-policy valence "1, and s
v
2 :
XfA;Dgf0; 1gX2  1
4
; 1
4
2  ! fA;D; ;g is a party choice in period 2 as a function
of xD1 ; W1; o1, x2; "1 and "2. Let S
A; SD; and Sv denote the strategy sets of each party and
of the voter, respectively.
For the voter, svt = ; denotes abstention in period t: Because turnout is costless, the
voter only abstains in equilibrium if she is indi¤erent. Given the random popularity shock
"t; the probability that the voter is indi¤erent at any given election is zero, so in equilibrium,
the voter votes for A or D with probability one. Hence, abstention plays no relevant role in
our model.22
Party j0s optimization problem in period t = 1 is:
max
sj2Sj

Pr[W1 = jj(s j; sv)] + Pr[W2 = jj(s j; sv)]
	
;
and in period 2 it reduces to
max
xj22fe;mg
Pr[W2 = jj(s j; sv)]:
The voters preferences over the two candidates in period t; given that the voter has belief
t over  and that candidates propose xt; are representable by the following net expected
utility function:
EU v[Aj(xt; t)]  EU v[Dj(xt; t)] = E[otj(xAt ; t)] + cAt + "t   E[otj(xDt ; t)]  cDt ; (2)
where the rst term on the right hand side is the expected economic outcome if party A
is elected, the second and third represent the competence and (relative) charisma of party
A; the fourth is the expected economic outcome if party D is elected and the fth is the
competence of party D: The voter prefers A to D in period t 2 f1; 2g if Expression (2) is
strictly positive, prefersD to A if the it is strictly negative, and is indi¤erent if the expression
22Results would hold unchanged if we rule out abstention, and we let the voter choose either A or D
arbitrarily in case of indi¤erence.
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is equal to zero.
For any implemented policy xw1 2 fm; eg and any economic outcome o1 2 f0; 1g; let
(xw1 ; o1)  Pr[ = mj(xw1 ; o1)] be the posterior probability that the state is m; conditional
on observing xw1 and o1; and given an unconditional prior probability Pr[ = m] = : By
Bayesrule,
(m; 0) =
 (1  h)
 (1  h) + (1  ) (1  l) =
 (1  h)
(1  ) (h   l) + (1  h) ; (3)
and (m; 1) = h
(h l)+l ; 
(e; 0) = (1 l)
1 h+(h l) ; 
(e; 1) = l
(1 )(h l)+l :
Denition 1 Agentsbeliefs satisfy consistency if they follow Bayesrules wherever applica-
ble, and:
i) period 2 beliefs about  are equal to (xw1 ; o1),
ii) beliefs about any unobserved "t for each t 2 f1; 2g are that "t is distributed uniformly
in
 1
4
; 1
4

:
This consistency requirement means that even o¤-path, after observing an unexpected
action by another player, players stick to their correct beliefs about Nature.23
Denition 2 A strategy prole (sA; sD; sv) and a system of consistent beliefs are an equi-
librium if:
i) Each party j 2 fA;Dg is sequential rational, and, if indi¤erent at any period t between
e or m; it chooses xjt = m;
ii) In period 1; the voter votes for A if
E[o1j(m;)] + c+ "1 > E[o1j(xD1 ; )] (4)
and for D if the inequality is reversed;
iii) In period 2; for any pair of platforms in each period (x1; x2); the voter votes for A if
E[o2j(xA2 ; (xw1 ; o1))] + c2(xA2 jxA1 ) + "2 > E[o2j(xD2 ; (xw1 ; o1))] + c(xD2 jxD1 )
23A Sequential equilibrium satises this consistency requirement. A Weak Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
need not.
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and for D if the inequality is reversed.
4. Formal Results and Proofs
We begin by showing that under the assumption that    the mainstream policy always
wins in the rst period election.
Lemma 1 If x1 = (m; e); then sv1 = A so x
w
1 = m and the probability that party A wins the
election is 1: If x1 = (m;m); then xw1 = m and the probability that party A wins the election
is 1
2
+ 2c:
Proof. Recall that the voter is myopic which means that she will maximize only her expected
utility from the current period in each period. Then if x1 = (m; e) the voters expected period
payo¤ from voting A is:
E[o1j(m;)] + c+ "1 = l + (h   l)+ c+ "1;
and the expected period payo¤ from voting D is
E[o1(e; )] = l + (h   l) (1  );
so the net of the two is
(h   l)+ c+ "1   (h   l) (1  ) = 2 (h   l)  (h   l) + c+ "1
 2 (h   l)

1
2
+
1  4c
8 (h   l)

  (h   l) + c  1
4
= 0:
since "1   14 : This implies that party A wins with certainty.
Alternatively, if x1 = (m;m), then E[o1(xD1 ; )] = l + (h   l), and party A wins if
"1 >  c; which occurs with probability 12 + 2c:
We next show that in the second period, the platform prole x2 = (e;m) cannot occur.
Lemma 2 x2 =
 
xA2 ; x
D
2

= (e;m) is not part of any pure strategy equilibrium.
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Proof. Suppose that x2 = (e;m) occurred in any pure strategy equilibrium. If the probabil-
ity of victory for A in this equilibrium is not strictly greater than 1
2
; A deviates to xA2 = m;
if it is strictly greater, then D deviates to xD2 = e:
The following Lemma shows that if the economic outcome is positive in the rst period
(and given Lemma 1, this is due to the mainstream policy) then in the second period both
parties will choose the mainstream policy.
Lemma 3 Let (sA; sD; sv) be an equilibrium strategy prole. If o1 = 1; then
(sA2 (x
D
1 ; "1; s
v
1(x
D
1 ; "1); 1); s
D
2 (x
D
1 ; "1; s
v
1(x
D
1 ; "1); 1)) = (m;m):
Proof. By Lemma 1, xw1 = m: Given x
w
1 = m and o1 = 1; 
(m; 1) = h
(h l)+l >  and
thus in period 2, if xj2 = m and x
 j
2 = e; then the voter prefers party j; for any valence
realization. Hence, both parties strictly prefer to propose m:
We are now ready to study the case where the economic outcome is bad at the end of
the rst period. We have to consider two cases: that with TE in the rst period and that
without. We begin with the former. For notational convenience, dene the following three
cuto¤s.
1  (h   l   c)(1  l)
(h   l) (2  h   l   c) ; (5)
2  1  l
2  h   l ;
3  (h   l + c)(1  l)
(h   l) (2  h   l + c) :
Lemma 4 Let (sA; sD; sv) be an equilibrium strategy prole. Then
 
sA2 (e; "1; A; 0); s
D
2 (e; "1; A; 0)

is equal to
(e; e) if  2 [0; 1) ;
(m; e) if  2 [1; 3) ;
(m;m) if  2 [3; 1] ;
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with second period expected utility for party A
1
2
  2c if  2 [0; 1) ;
1
2
  2 (h   l)

1  2 1 h
1 l (h l)

if  2 [1; 3) ;
1
2
+ 2c if  2 [3; 1] :
Proof. Note that sv1(e; "1) = A implies x
w
1 = m; and x
w
1 = m and o1 = 0 imply that
(m; 0) =
 (1  h)
(1  ) (h   l) + (1  h) ; (6)
which is greater than 1
2
i¤  > 1 l
2 l h : Let EU
v
2 [jj(xD1 ; x2; )] denote the expected utility
for the voter from electing party j; given xD1 and x2 and posterior 
 on the state of Nature.
Now since
EU v2 [Dj(e; (e; e); )] = l + (h   l) (1  ) + c and
EU v2 [Aj(e; (e; e); )] = l + (h   l) (1  ) + "2;
then
Pr[A winsj(e; (e; e); )] = Pr

"2 2

c;
1
4

=
1
2
  2c 2

0;
1
2

:
Whereas,
EU v2 [Dj(e; (m; e); )] = l + (h   l) (1  ) + c and
EU v2 [Aj(e; (m; e); )] = l + (h   l) + c+ "2;
thus
Pr[A winsj(e; (m; e); (m; 0))] = Pr

"2 2

(h   l) (1  2(m; 0)) ; 1
4

; (7)
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which is equal to
0 if  2

0;
(1  l)(4 (h   l)  1)
(h   l) (7  8l   4 (h   l))

;
1
2
  2 (h   l)

1  2 1  h
1  l    (h   l)

if  2

(1  l)(4 (h   l)  1)
(h   l) (7  8l   4 (h   l)) ;
(1  l)(1 + 4 (h   l))
(h   l) (9  8l   4 (h   l))

; and
1 if  2

(1 + 4 (h   l))(1  l)
(h   l) (9  8l   4 (h   l)) ; 1

;
where the cuto¤s are obtained by substituting (6) for (m; 0) in (7) and solving:
(h   l)

1  2 1  h
1  l    (h   l)

= 1
4
:
Similarly,
EU v2 [Dj(e; (m;m); )] = l + (h   l) and
EU v2 [Aj(e; (m;m); )] = l + (h   l) + c+ "2;
so
Pr[A winsj(e; (m;m); (m; 0))] = Pr["2 2

 c; 1
4

=
1
2
+ 2c 2

1
2
; 1

:
Therefore
Pr[A winsj(e; (e; e); (m; 0))] > Pr[A winsj(e; (m; e); (m; 0))], c < (h   l) (1  2(m; 0))
, (m; 0) < 1
2
  c
2 (h   l) ; and
Pr[A winsj(e; (m; e); )] > Pr[A winsj(e; (m;m); (m; 0))]
, (h   l) (1  2(m; 0)) <  c
, (m; 0) > 1
2
+
c
2 (h   l) :
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Since A has greater incentives to deviate from (e; e) than D; it follows that
 
sA2 (e; "1; A; 0); s
D
2 (e; "1; A; 0)

= (e; e)
is a mutual best response for the second period given xD1 = e; s
v
1(e; "1) = A and o1 = 0 if and
only if (m; 0) < 1
2
  c
2(h l) : Similarly, D has greater incentives to deviate from (m;m)
than A; so
 
sA2 (e; "1; A; 0); s
D
2 (e; "1; A; 0)

= (m;m) is a mutual best response for the sec-
ond period given xD1 = e; s
v
1(e; "1) = A and o1 = 0 if and only if 
(m; 0) > 1
2
+ c
2(h l) : If 
 2
1
2
  c
2(h l) ;
1
2
+ c
2(h l)

; then the mutual best response is
 
sA2 (e; "1; A; 0); s
D
2 (e; "1; A; 0)

=
(m; e): The intervals for  follow by simple substitution:

1  h
1  l    (h   l) =
1
2
  c
2 (h   l) ,  =
(h   l   c)(1  l)
(h   l) (2  h   l   c) and

1  h
1  l    (h   l) =
1
2
+
c
2 (h   l) ,  =
(h   l + c)(1  l)
(h   l) (2  h   l + c) :
Next we consider the branch of the tree without TE in the rst period.
Lemma 5 Let (sA; sD; sv) be an equilibrium strategy prole. Then for each j 2 fA;Dg; 
sA2 (m; "1; j; 0); s
D
2 (m; "1; j; 0)

is equal to
(e; e) if  2 [0; 1) ;
(m; e) if  2 [1; 2) ;
(m;m) if  2 [2; 1] ;
with second period utility for party A
1
2
if  2 [0; 1) ;
1
2
+ 2c  2 (h   l)

1  2 1 h
1 l (h l)

if  2 [1; 2) ;
1
2
+ 2c if  2 [2; 1] :
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Proof. Since
EU v2 [Dj(m; (e; e); )] = l + (h   l) (1  ) and
EU v2 [Aj(m; (e; e); )] = l + (h   l) (1  ) + "2;
then
Pr[A winsj(m; (e; e); )] = Pr

"2 2

0;
1
4

=
1
2
:
Whereas,
EU v2 [Dj(m; (m; e); )] = l + (h   l) (1  ) and
EU v2 [Aj(m; (m; e); )] = l + (h   l) + c+ "2;
thus
Pr[A winsj(e; (m; e); (m; 0))] = Pr [(h   l)(m; 0) + c+ "2 > (h   l) (1  (m; 0))]
= Pr

"2 2

(h   l) (1  2(m; 0))  c; 1
4

;
which is equal to:
0 if  2

0;
(1  l)( 1  4c+ 4 (h   l))
(h   l) (7  8l   4 (h   l)  4c)

;
1
2
+ 2c  2 (h   l)

1  2 1  h
1  l    (h   l)

if  2

(1  l)( 1  4c+ 4 (h   l))
(h   l) (7  8l   4 (h   l)  4c) ;
(1  l)(1  4c+ 4 (h   l))
(h   l) (9  8l   4 (h   l)  4c)

; and
1 if  2

(1  l)(1  4c+ 4 (h   l))
(h   l) (9  8l   4 (h   l)  4c) ; 1

;
where the cuto¤s are obtained from
(h   l)

1  2 1  h
1  l    (h   l)

  c = 1
4
:
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Similarly,
EU v2 [Dj(m; (m;m); )] = l + (h   l) and
EU v2 [Aj(m; (m;m); )] = l + (h   l) + c+ "2;
so
Pr[A winsj(m; (m;m); (m; 0))] = Pr["2 2

 c; 1
4

=
1
2
+ 2c 2

1
2
; 1

:
Therefore
Pr[A winsj(m; (e; e); (m; 0))] > Pr[A winsj(m; (m; e); (m; 0))]
, 0 < (h   l) (1  2(m; 0))  c
, (m; 0) < 1
2
  c
2 (h   l) ; and
Pr[A winsj(m; (m; e); (m; 0))]  Pr[A winsj(m; (m;m); (m; 0))]
, (h   l) (1  2(m; 0))  c   c
, (m; 0)  1
2
:
Since A has greater incentives to deviate from (e; e) than D; it follows that for each
j 2 fA;Dg;  sA2 (m; "1; j; 0); sD2 (m; "1; j; 0) = (e; e) is a mutual best response for the second
period given xD1 = m; s
v
1(m; "1) = j and o1 = 0 if and only if 2 <
1
2
  c
2(h l) : Similarly, D
has greater incentives to deviate from (m;m) than A; so
 
sA2 (m; "1; j; 0); s
D
2 (m; "1; j; 0)

=
(m;m) is a mutual best response for the second period given xD1 = m; s
v
1(m; "1) = j and
o1 = 0 if and only if 2  12 : If 2 2

1
2
  c
2(h l) ;
1
2

; then the mutual best response is 
sA2 (m; "1; j; 0); s
D
2 (m; "1; j; 0)

= (m; e): The intervals for  follow by simple substitution as
before where the new term is

1  h
1  l    (h   l) =
1
2
,  = 1  l
2  h   l :
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For completeness, we should also consider the actions in the second period, after xD1 =
e and the voter deviates to vote D: Since voters are myopic, this would never occur in
equilibrium and so we omit this analysis which is available upon request. We now move
to characterizing the expected probability of winning for party A in the both periods as a
function of party Ds decision to pursue TE or not. We then have the following.
Lemma 6 The total expected utility for party A over the two periods given xD1 = m is
1
2
+ 2c+ 1
2
+ 2c (l +  (h   l)) if  2 (; 1) ;
1
2
+ 2c+ 1
2
+ 2c  2 (h   l) (1  l) + 2 (h   l) (2  h   l) if  2 [1; 2) ;
and 1
2
+ 2c+ 1
2
+ 2c if  2 [2; 1) :
(8)
while the total expected utility for party A over the two periods given xD1 = e is
1 + 1
2
  2c (1  2l   2 (h   l)) if  2 (; 1) ;
1 + 1
2
+ 2c (l +  (h   l))  2 (h   l) (1  l) + 2 (h   l) (2  h   l) if  2 [1; 3) ;
1 + 1
2
+ 2c if  2 [3; 1) :
(9)
Proof. Let E[P2(xD1 )] denote the probability that A wins the second period election, as a
function of xD1 ; evaluated before the realization of o1: This can be calculated by noting that
in the second period both parties will choose platform prole (m;m) if either o1 = 1 (which
happens with probability l + (h   l)) or if o1 = 0 (which happens with probability
1   h + (h   l) (1  )) and  is large enough (  2 without TE and   3 with
TE). In the remaining cases, where o1 = 0 and  is not that large, the probability that
A wins follows from substitution from Lemmas 4 and 5. Putting these together with the
probabilities of winning in the rst period (1 under TE and 1
2
+ c if not) given by 1 provides
us the result.
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We are now ready to describe our main result which builds on the preceding Lemmas.
Dene 3 be the value of 3 in Expression 5 evaluated at c =
1
4
; namely,
3 
(1  l)(1 + 4 (h   l))
(h   l) (9  4l   4h) :
Proposition 1 Dene the function  by
(; h; l) =
8<: 14(2 l (h l)) if  2 (; 2)1+4(h l)(2+l(1 ) h 1)
4(2 l (h l)) if  2 (2; 3] :
Then, if  2 (; 3] in equilibrium TE occurs if and only if c  : Otherwise, there is no TE
in equilibrium.
Proof. The probability that party D wins an election is the reciprocal of the probability
that party A wins an election. Therefore, an equilibrium in which party D chooses xD1 = e
exists if and only if, for the given ; the utility value in Expression 9 is strictly lower than
the value in Expression 8.
For  2 (; 1) ; the condition is
1
2
+ 2c+
1
2
+ 2c (l +  (h   l)) > 1 + 1
2
  2c (1  2l   2 (h   l))
, c > 1
4 (2  l    (h   l)) :
For  2 (1; 2) ; the condition is
1
2
+ 2c+
1
2
+ 2c  2 (h   l) (1  l) + 2 (h   l) (2  h   l) >
1 +
1
2
+ 2c (l +  (h   l))  2 (h   l) (1  l) + 2 (h   l) (2  h   l)
, c > 1
4(2  l    (h   l)) :
which the same condition as in the rst case.
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For  2 (2; 3) ; the condition is
1
2
+ 2c+
1
2
+ 2c
> 1 +
1
2
+ 2c (l +  (h   l))  2 (h   l) (1  l) + 2 (h   l) (2  h   l)
, c > 1 + 4 (h   l) (2+ l (1  )  h   1)
4(2  l    (h   l)) :
The function  represents these lower bounds for di¤erent values of  and it is easy to
show that  is continuous. Finally, since
@3
@c
=
2
(h   l) (l   1)
h   1
(c  h   l + 2)2
> 0;
the largest value of  for which this case applies is the case with 3:
We next look at comparative statics, beginning with :
Proposition 2 For any  2 (; 3) ;  is a strictly increasing function of :
Proof. For any  2 (; 2) ;
@
@
 =
1
4
h   l
(2  l    (h   l))2
> 0.
For any  2 (2; 3) ;
@
@
 =
@
@

1 + 4 (h   l) (2+ l (1  )  h   1)
4(2  l    (h   l))

=
1
4
(h   l)  24l   12 (h   l) + 8
2
l + 8l (h   l) + 17
(l +  (h   l)  2)2
;
which is strictly positive if and only if
 24l   12 (h   l) + 82l + 8l (h   l) + 17 > 0;
which holds. Finally,  is not di¤erentiable at  = 2 but since @@

!(2)+
and @
@


!(2) 
are strictly positive, the result still holds.
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Proposition 3 below looks at the comparative statics when we change l holding h   l
constant. Dene
~l =

1
4
p
2

2(h l)+2
p
2
p
2(h l)2+1+2(h l)2 
p
2(h l)
p
2(h l)2+1 4p
2(h l)2+1 
p
2
and
e = 1
2
+
1
2 (h   l)  
q
4 (h   l)2 + 2
4 (h   l) :
Proposition 3 If l  ~l; then  is a strictly increasing function of l for  < 2 and
strictly decreasing for  2 (2; 3): If l > ~l then e > 2 and  is a strictly increasing
function of l for  < e and strictly decreasing for  > e:
Proof. For any  2 (; 2) ;
@
@l


h l=const:
=
1
4 (2  l    (h   l))2
> 0:
For any  2 (2; 3) ;
@
@l


h l=const:
=
1 + 4 (h   l) ( 2+ 22n (h   l) + 1  2 (h   l))
4(2  l    (h   l))2 ;
which is strictly positive if
1 + 4 (h   l) ( 2+ 22 (h   l) + 1  2 (h   l)) > 0
,  < e;
and strictly negative if vice-versa.
Note that for l  1 (h   l) (true by denition) and h l  14 (true by assumption),
l  ~l implies e  2; and then  2 (2; 3) implies  > e; so if l  ~l;  is a strictly
increasing function of l for  < 2 and strictly decreasing for  2 (2; 3): Whereas, if
l > ~l, then e > 2 and the derivative of interest is strictly positive for  < e and strictly
negative for  > e:
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Remark 2 follows as a corollary: if  is low (below a threshold that takes the value 2
or e in di¤erent cases), then  is strictly increasing l; which means that if the environment
deteriorates,  takes a lower value, hence TE holds for a larger set of values of parameter
c: Whereas, if  is above the relevant threshold, then  is strictly decreasing in l; which
means that if the environment deteriorates,  takes a higher value, and hence TE holds for
a lower set of values of c:
Next we consider a decrease in the relevance of luck, keeping the ratio of bad luck (1 h)
over total luck (l + 1   h) constant. Dene the ratio   1  h
l + 1  h constant. In order
to simplify the analysis we use the notation ! = 1  h:
Proposition 4 For each  2 (0;1); dene
! = (1 )(2 )
   
1
2
(1  )
p
(+ 2)(24+8 172 52 822 42+162+242)
( )(+ 2) and
 =
 11+ 42 + 8
 24+ 82 + 17 .
If h  1   ! and  > ; then  is a strictly increasing function of h   l; whereas, if
h > 1  ! or   , then  is a strictly decreasing function of h   l:
Proof. We have two cases.
1. For any  2

; 1 l
2 h l

= (; 2) ;
 =
1  
4 (   2+ + !   ! + 2) ;
so that the derivative of this with respect to !, given the constraint, is equivalent to
an increase in l + ! and so a decrease in h   l: Thus,
@
@!
> 0, @
@ (h   l) < 0:
So
@
@!
=
1
4
(1  )   
(   2+ !  !+ + 2)2 :
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This implies
@
@ (h   l) > 0,  > :
2.  2

2;
(1 l)(1+4(h l))
(h l)(9 8l 4(h l))

: Now
 = 1
4(1 )
4+6+4! 32 8+42 4!2 4!2 42!+8!2+82! 8! 3
  2++! !+2 :
We get
@
@!
=
1
4
4( )(+ 2)!2 8(1 )(2 )(+ 2)!+(1 )2( +5 42 16+82+8)
(1 )(  2+! !++2)2 :
The sign depend on the sign of the numerator which is a quadratic function of ! with
extremum at
! =
(1  ) (2  )
   ;
and two roots
!A = (1 )(2 )
  +
1
2
(1  )
p
(+ 2)(24+8 172 52 822 42+162+242)
( )(+ 2) ;
!B = (1 )(2 )
   
1
2
(1  )
p
(+ 2)(24+8 172 52 822 42+162+242)
( )(+ 2) :
For our parameter values both roots are real valued. This means that if  >  then
we have a strictly convex quadratic function with global minimum at ! which has
roots at !A > ! and !B < !: So this is negative in the interval
 
!B; !A

: If  < 
then we have a strictly concave function with global maximum at ! which has roots
at !A < ! and !B > !: So this is positive in the interval
 
!A; !B

: Further, since
l + ! =
1
1  ! = 1  h + l )
1
1  !  1, !  1  
it easy to see that if  >  then ! > 1   while if  <  then ! < 0: So:
 If  >  then we have a strictly convex function with constrained global minimum
42
at 1  : So this is negative in the interval  min(!B; 1  ); 1   :
 If  <  then we have a strictly concave function with constrained global maximum
at 0: So this is positive in the interval
 
0;max
 
!B; 0

:
From now on, let ! = !B: We can now compare ! with 0 and 1   : We can show
that
(1 )(2 )
   
1
2
(1  )
p
(+ 2)(24+8 172 52 822 42+162+242)
( )(+ 2) > 0
i¤  < 1
16 8

16 
p
3
p
 48+ 322 + 43 + 1

or  > 1
16 8

16+
p
3
p
 48+ 322 + 43 + 1

;
and since both expressions are greater than one this always holds. So ! > 0: Now
(1 )(2 )
   
1
2
(1  )
p
(+ 2)(24+8 172 52 822 42+162+242)
( )(+ 2) < 1  
i¤  >  11+4
2+8
 24+82+17 = :
Noting that  >  if and only  < 12 < ; we can summarize the previous results as
follows:
a. If    < ; then @@! > 0 is positive.
b. If  >  > ; then
@
@!
is positive in the interval (0; !) and negative otherwise.
c. If  >  >  then
@
@!
is positive in the interval (0; !) and negative otherwise.
Therefore,
@
@ (h   l) > 0,  >  and !  !
:
In addition,  is increasing in : This means that for a given h   l; the condition
@
@(h l) > 0 holds for a larger range of values of  if 1  h is high relative to l.
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We now turn to welfare analysis where the comparison is between the equilibrium outcome
in Proposition 1 and the platform choices that a social planner would choose if this planner
is trying to maximize the voters utility over two periods. We obtain the result below which
implies that in equilibrium there is too little TE from the planners perspective when  is
relatively low and too much when  is relatively high.
Proposition 5 There exists O 2 0; 1
4

such that the social planner prefers tactical extrem-
ism i¤ c > O: Further, there exists b 2 (2; 3) such that O <  if  < b; whereas O > 
if  > b:
Proof. We consider three cases where  <  < 1, 1   < 2 and 2   < 3 and
for each we determine conditions on c such that the planner would prefer TE and then
compare with the equilibrium : Note rst that in the rst election, if both parties choose
platform m then the voter has a choice of voting for A which gives her non-policy utility
c+"1 or for party D which gives her non-policy utility 0: In case of TE, given our parametric
assumptions, then A will win for sure so that the voter gets non-policy utility c + "1: This
means that TE lowers the voters expected utility whenever c + "1 < 0 or, more precisely,
the expected loss from TE is
E [c+ "1jc+ "1 < 0] Pr[c+ "1 < 0] =
Z  c
  1
4
2 (c+ t) dt =  c2 + 1
2
c  1
16
:
1. If  2 (; 1); then we have that conditional on a bad outcome, TE has an advantage
since max ("2; c) > max ("2; 0) : In particular, this matters when "2 < c and so the
expected gain from TE is
E[c  "2j"2 2 (0; c)] Pr["2 2 (0; c)] + cPr["2 < 0]
=
Z c
0
2(c  t)dt+ c
Z 0
  1
4
2dt =
1
2
c (2c+ 1) :
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The voter prefers TE if
 c2 + 1
2
c  1
16
+ (1  h + (1  ) (h   l)) 1
2
c (2c+ 1) > 0
,   (l +  (h   l)) c2 + 1
2
(2  l    (h   l)) c  1
16
> 0
,  c2 + 1
2
(2  ) c  1
16
> 0;
where we have used the substitution   l +  (h   l) : Then the two roots are
2 +
p 5 + 2 + 4
4
  1
4
and
2 p 5 + 2 + 4
4
  1
4
;
The term under square root is positive and so the two roots are well dened. Also,
dening f 
p 5+2+4
4
> 0; we can rewrite the two roots as
1
2
  1
4
+ f and
1
2
  1
4
  f;
and since  < 1; the rst root is greater than 1
4
, which means it is outside of the
admissible range. So, the correct root is O = 1
2
  1
4
  f . Comparing O to the
equilibrium boundary
 =
1
4 (2  l    (h   l)) =
1
4 (2  )
yields
1
2
  1
4
  f < 1
4 (2  ) ;
so for  < 1; O < :
2. If  2 (1; 2) then we have that conditional on a bad outcome, TE yields a second
period benet, since
maxf(m; 0) + c+ "2; 1  (m; 0) + cg > maxf(m; 0) + c+ "2; 1  (m; 0)g:
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In particular, there is no benet from TE if
(m; 0) + c+ "2 > 1  (m; 0) + c;
or equivalently, if "2 > 1  2(m; 0); whereas if
1  (m; 0) + c > (m; 0) + c+ "2 > 1  (m; 0);
or equivalently, if "2 2 (1  2(m; 0)  c; 1  2(m; 0)); then the expected gain from
TE (times the probability for this case) is
Z 1 2(m;0)
1 2(m;0) c
2 (1  (m; 0) + c  (m; 0)  c  t) dt = c2:
Finally, if
1  (m; 0) + c > 1  (m; 0) > (m; 0) + c+ "2;
or equivalently, "2 < 1   2(m; 0)   c; then the expected gain from TE (times the
probability for this case) is
Z 1 2(m;0) c
  1
4
2cdt =
1
2
c (5  4c  8(m; 0)) :
This means that the voter prefers TE whenever
 c2+ 1
2
c  1
16
+(1  h + (1  ) (h   l))

1
2
c (5  4c  8(m; 0)) + c2

> 0: (10)
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Substituting in the value of (m; 0) (Expression 3), Inequality 10 becomes
  (2  l  (h l)) c2
+
1
2

1+ (1  h + (1  ) (h l))

5  8  (1  h)
(1  ) (h   l) +1  h

c  1
16
> 0
,   (2  l    (h   l)) c2 + 1
2
( 8  5l + 8l + 3 (h   l) + 6) c  1
16
> 0
,  c2+1
2
(2  ) c  1
16
+2

(  1) c2 + ((2  1)  + 1 + 2 ((1  ) (h   l)  1)) c

> 0:
The term  c2 + 1
2
(2  ) c   1
16
is the same as in the previous case. Consider the
term in square brackets. Its derivative with respect to  is negative:
d

[(  1) c2 + ((2  1) (l   1) +  (h   l))]=l+(h l)

d
= l+h+c
2 (h   l) 2;
which is strictly negative for any c: The derivative of the term outside square brackets
is also negative
d
 c2 + 1
2
(2  ) c  1
16

=l+(h l)

d
=  1
2
c (h   l) (2c+ 1) < 0
for any c. Dene
F (c; )   c2+1
2
(2  ) c  1
16
+2

(  1) c2 + ((2  1) (l   1) +  (h   l)) c

:
It follows that the expression F (c; ) as a function of , for any c; is minimized in our
range (1; 2) for  = 2; and maximized for  = 1: Since F (c; ) is quadratic and
concave in c and negative for c = 0, for  = 2; F (c; )j=2 considered as a function
only of c is the lowest value of F (c; ); and so the roots of c that solve
F (c; 2) = 0
are going to be the closest to each other, and in particular, the lower root of this
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equation, is larger than for any other value of . If the upper root is above c = 1
4
then
only the lower root matters and this will therefore be the highest possible value of the
root in our range - the worst case scenario. We now study these roots. So
F (c; 2) =
1
16
 
16c+ 16c2  8c  32c2   1 ;
which has roots
1
4
2   +p 3 + 2 + 2
2   and
1
4
2   p 3 + 2 + 2
2   :
The term in square roots is always positive, so the rst root above is clearly greater
than 1
4
: So the relevant root is
1
4
2   p 3 + 2 + 2
2   (11)
and 1
4
2  p 3+2+2
2  < . This is the worst-case scenario cut-o¤ so, although this is
not O, still we must have O  1
4
2  p 3+2+2
2  < :
3. If 2   < 3 then we have that conditional on a bad outcome, TE does not have an
obvious advantage. We have
1   + c >  ,  < 1 + c
2
,  < (1  l) (1 + c)
2  2l   (h   l) (1  c) ;
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but
3   (1  l) (1 + c)
2  2l   (h   l) (1  c)
= 2c (1  (h   l)) (1  l) 1  h
(h   l) (2  h   l + c) (2  2l   (h   l) (1  c)) > 0;
(1  l) (1 + c)
2  2l   (h   l) (1  c)   2
= 2c (1  l) 1  h
(2  h   l) (2  2l   (h   l) (1  c)) > 0;
so that this condition discriminates between the two cases. This means that if
(1  l) (1 + c)
2  2l   (h   l) (1  c) <  < 3;
then there is either no advantage of TE or a disadvantage. We therefore, from now on,
assume
2 <  <
(1  l) (1 + c)
2  2l   (h   l) (1  c) :
In that case, if
 + c+ "2 > 1   + c > 2 , "2 > 1  2;
then there is no advantage to TE. If
1   + c >  + c+ "2 >  ,  c < "2 < 1  2;
then the expected gain from TE (times the probability for this case) is
Z 1 2
 c
2 (1   + c     c  t) dt = (c  2 + 1)2 :
If
1   + c >  >  + c+ "2 ,  c > "2;
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then the expected gain from TE (times the probability for this case) is
Z  c
  1
4
2 (1   + c  ) dt = 1
2
(1  4c) (c  2 + 1) :
This means that the voter prefers TE whenever
 c2 + 1
2
c  1
16
+ (1  h + (1  ) (h   l))

(c  2 + 1)2 + 1
2
(1  4c) (c  2 + 1)

> 0
,   (2  l    (h   l)) c2 + 1
2
(2  l    (h   l)) c  1
16
 > 0
,   (2  ) c2 + 1
2
(2  ) c  1
16
 > 0; (12)
where
 =
80+47l 642 242l  822h 2422l  33h 127l+482h+482l +802l 322hl+32hl 23
1  :
Denote the left hand side of Inequality 12 as G (c; ) : Function G (c; ) has roots
1
4
2   p(2  ) (2    )
2   and
1
4
2   +p(2  ) (2    )
2   ;
where the second root for the usual arguments does not apply. In the rst root the
term in square root is positive for  = 2 because"
1
4
2   p(2  ) (2    )
2  
#
=2
=

1
4
2   p 3 + 2 + 2
2  

=2
;
where the term on the right hand side is the root in Expression 11 above. We know
this root is well-dened and implies
G (c; 2) = F (c; 2) :
So let
O =
1
4
2   p(2  ) (2    )
2   :
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Now note also that
G

c;
(1  l) (1 + c)
2  2l   (h   l) (1  c)

=   1
16
(4c  1)2 < 0:
All of this implies that if O is a strictly increasing function of  (clearly it is continu-
ous), there must exist a b < (1 l)(1+c)
2 2l (h l)(1 c) such that
O (b) =  (b) = 1 + 4 (h   l) (b (2  h   l) + l   1)
4(2  l   b (h   l))
and O <  for  < b and vice-versa for  > b proving our result: So now we study
@O
@
=
1
8 (  1)
q
2 
1  ( 8 5l+8l+3(h l)+5)2
( 8 5l+8l+3(h l)+5)( 2)2 (13)
27h+53l 212l +24h 24l 43hl 192h
+212l +16h
2
l 16h2l +162hl 2hl 32

The rst term that needs to be signed is
( 8  5l + 8l + 3 (h   l) + 5) ;
which is decreasing in : But
[( 8  5l + 8l + 3 (h   l) + 5)]
=
(1 l)(1+c)
2 2l (h l)(1 c)
= 2 (1  l) (1  4c) 1  h
2  2l   (h   l) (1  c) > 0;
and so this is positive over our interval of interest. Now to economize on notation, let
h   l = : 0@ 27h+53l 212l +24h 24l 43hl 192h
+212l +16h
2
l 16h2l +162hl 2hl 32
1A =

  40l   19h   l + 162l + 16l+ 24  (1  l)   48l   27+ 162l + 16l+ 32 :
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Dene
B    40l   19+ 162l + 16l+ 24 and
C    48l   27+ 162l + 16l+ 32 :
B is decreasing in l so setting l = 1    (as large as possible) makes it as small as
possible and we get
[B]l=1  =
  40l   19+ 162l + 16l+ 24l=1  = 5:
So B  (1  l) C is increasing in . That is,
B  (1  l) C
is maximized over  in the interval (2; 3) at  = 3 and we get
[B  (1  l) C]
=
(1 l)(1+c)
2 2l (1 c)
= 2 (1  l)
 
48l + 23  4c  162l   16l  32
 1  h
2  h   l + c (h   l) ;
where every component is positive except for
48l + 23  4c  162l   16l  32;
which is increasing in l: So setting l = 1   (as large as possible) makes it as large
as possible and we get

48l + 23  4c  162l   16l  32

l=1  =   (4c+ 9) < 0:
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This proves that
0 > [B  (1  l) C]
==
(1 l)(1+c)
2 2l (1 c)
> B  (1  l) C:
But, then going back to @
O
@
(Expression 13), all component are positive except for
  1 at the denominator which is negative and the expression B  (1  l) C which
we just studied. Hence @
O
@
> 0:
5. Extensions
We next provide three extensions to the theory:
1. Forward-looking voters, who are fully rational and sophisticated, and vote today
taking into account how the current period outcome indirectly a¤ects their expected utility
in future periods.
2. Uncertainty about party-specic competence on each policy, instead of about which
policy is correct.
3. An innite horizon of elections, with impatient parties.
Qualitative results are robust across these extensions: with su¢ cient uncertainty, if a
party faces a disadvantage over the mainstream policy and can build up a better reputation
for competence on an alternative policy, then if the party is su¢ ciently patient, it faces
incentives to choose tactical extremism.
An alternative robustness check, in which we assume that parties know the state and
can signal it to the voter through their platform choices, is available from the authors upon
request. We show that if there is su¢ cient uncertainty about the mainstream policy and
competence matters enough, then an equilibrium with Tactical Extremism exists in this
environment as well.
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5.1. Forward-looking voters
In this extension, we consider a fully rational voter who maximizes her expected utility
summed across both periods, under the simplifying assumption that h =  and l = 1  
for some  2  1
2
; 1

:
In the second period, the expected utility for the voter from voting to party A; and the
expected utility of voting for party D are, respectively,
E[o2j(xA2 ; (xw1 ; o1)] + cA2 (xA2 ) + "2; and
E[o2j(xD2 ; (xw1 ; o1)] + cA2 (xD2 jxD1 ):
The voter optimizes by choosing the party that maximizes her expected utility.
For any party strategies sA 2 SA and sD 2 SD; and for any voter strategy sv1 2 fA;Dg;
let EU2(sA; sD; sv1) be the expected utility of the voter in the second period -evaluated before
the voter observes o1), given that parties played the strategies sA and sD and the voter played
sv1 in the rst period, and given that the voter will choose optimally in the second period.
The voters expected utility over the whole game, subject to voting to party A in the rst
period, and subject to voting to party D is, respectively,
E[o1j(m;)] + c+ "1 + EU v2 (sA; sD; A); and
E[o1j(sD1 ; )] + EU v2 (sA; sD; D):
In the rst period the voter optimizes by choosing the party that maximizes this aggregate
expected utility.
Results.
Note that
(m; 0) = (e; 1) =
(1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) ; and
(m; 1) = (e; 0) =

 + (1  )(1  ) :
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If xw1 = m; the second period will be solved exactly as in the case with myopic voters.
Therefore, Lemma 2 applies. A modied Lemma 3 applies as well.
Lemma 3b. For any equilibrium strategy prole (sA; sD; sv) such that xw1 = m;
(sA2 (x
D
1 ; "1; s
v
1(x
D
1 ; "1); 1); s
D
2 (x
D
1 ; "1; s
v
1(x
D
1 ; "1); 1) = (m;m);
and for any equilibrium strategy prole (sA; sD; sv) such that xw1 = e;
(sA2 (x
D
1 ; "1; s
v
1(x
D
1 ; "1); 0); s
D
2 (x
D
1 ; "1; s
v
1(x
D
1 ; "1); 0) = (m;m):
The intuition for the proof is the same: a good outcome given xw1 = m; or a bad outcome
given xw1 = e both induce a posterior 
 > ; so that the voter will only vote for mainstream
policies in the second period.
Similarly, a modied Lemma 4 applies.
Lemma 4b Let (sA; sD; sv) be an equilibrium strategy prole. Then
 
sA2 (e; "1; A; 0); s
D
2 (e; "1; A; 0)

and
 
sA2 (e; "1; D; 1); s
D
2 (e; "1; D; 1)

are equal to
(e; e) if  2 [0; 1) ;
(m; e) if  2 [1; 3) ;
(m;m) if  2 [3; 1] ;
with second period expected utility for party A
1
2
  2c if  2 [0; 1) ;
1
2
  2 (2   1)

 
 (2 1)

if  2 [1; 3) ;
1
2
+ 2c if  2 [3; 1] :
The proof is the proof of Lemma 4, now applied as well to the case in which the voter
updates negatively on the mainstream policy after voting D with xD1 = e and obtaining a
good economic outcome in the rst period. Lemma 5 holds as stated, with its proof.
We conclude with the key insight, regarding voting behavior in period 1, subject to
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Tactical Extremism. By Lemma 3b and Lemma 4b, the equilibrium actions in the second
period do not depend on sv1: Hence, the expected voters second period payo¤ is una¤ected
by the voters rst period play and a fully rational, forward-looking voter optimizes over the
two periods by optimizing her vote over each period myopically.
Therefore, under the assumption that h = 1  l; Propositions 1, 2 and 3 and Remark
1 are robust, whether voters are fully rational (forward looking, sophisticated), or myopic.24
5.2. Uncertainty about party-specic policy competence
Consider an extension in which the economic outcome in a given period reveals information
about the incumbents competence at implementing the chosen policy, as in Butt (2006)
or Dewan and Hortala-Vallve (2017), but it does not reveal any information about the
opposition.
That is, assume that the uncertainty is not just about the policy, but rather, it is about
the policy-party pair. Specically, suppose that the state of the world  2 f0; 1g4 has four
components
   Am; Ae ; Dm; De  ;
where for each party j 2 fA;Bg and each policy p 2 fm; eg; jp 2 f0; 1g denotes the intrinsic
ability of party j on policy p: We interpret jp = 0 to mean that party j has no ability on p;
and jp = 1 to mean that party j has high intrinsic ability on p:
To micro-found the asymmetry in beliefs about the ability of the two parties, we now
consider a model with four periods f0; 1; 2; 3g: periods 0 and 1 occurred before the strate-
gic environment we analyze, and they constitute the history that leads to the asymmetry,
starting from a symmetric environment at period 0:
In this model, we dispense with the additive parameter c > 0; and we instead let the
competence of party j 2 fA;Dg on a given policy p 2 fm; eg a¤ect the probability that the
economic outcome is good if party j implements policy p:
For each period t 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g; for each party j 2 fA;Dg, and for each policy p 2 (m; e);
let cjt(p) 2 f0; 1g denote the competence of party j on policy p in period t: To capture that
24Proposition 3 and Remark 2 involve a comparative static that violates the assumption that h = 1  l:
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acquiring competence requires both preparation and ability, we assume that the rst time
that a party chooses a policy, it is not competent on this policy, but if it is chooses the same
policy again a second consecutive time, and the party has intrinsic ability on this policy,
then this second time the party is competent on the policy in question.
Formally, for any period t 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g; for any party j 2 fA;Dg; and for any policy
p 2 fm; eg; cjt(p) = jp if xjt = xjt 1 and cjt(p) = 0 if xjt 6= xjt 1.
In this model, the advantage of competence on a given policy is that it makes a good
economic outcome more likely, so we do not need to incorporate an additive parameter
c (equivalently, we can assume c = 0). Instead, we assume that a policy executed with
competence delivers a good economic outcome with probability  > 1
2
; whereas executed
incompetently, it delivers a good economic outcome with probability 1  : Formally,
Pr[ot = 1jWt = j] =
8<:  if c
j
t(x
j
t) = 1
1   if cjt(xjt) = 0:
Suppose there is a common independent prior at period 0 that Pr[De = 1] = Pr[
A
e =
1] = 1
2
and Pr[Dm = 1] = Pr[
A
m = 1] =  2
 
1
2
; 

; so that both parties are more likely to be
good at the mainstream policy, than at the extreme policy, which is another way of saying
that ex-ante, economic outcomes are more likely to be good choosing the mainstream policy
than the extreme one.25 For each party j 2 fA;Dg; each policy p 2 fm; eg and each period
t 2 f1; 2; 3g; let jt(p) denote the posterior on Pr[jp = 1]:
We consider the strategic scenario at the beginning of period 2; given that both parties
had proposed the mainstream policy m in periods 0 and 1: In period 0; neither party had
experience, so they were both incompetent, and the probability of a good outcome is 1  ;
regardless of ability, so nothing can be learned about the state of the world from the economic
outcome. In period 1; on the other hand, both parties had previous experience on policy m;
so their competence is equal to their ability.
Without loss of generality, suppose that D is the party that won the election in period
25The assumption that the priors are independent is a simplication, so that if Party j delivers a bad
economic outcome implementing policy p; we do not learn anything about Party j0s ability to implement
the other policy, nor about the other partys ability to implement p:
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1; and implemented policy m: Conditioning on Dm = 1, c
D
1 (m) = 1 and the probability of a
good economic outcome is ; while conditioning on Dm = 0, c
D
1 (m) = 0 and the probability of
a good economic outcome is 1  : Suppose the realized economic outcome was bad, o1 = 0.
The economic outcome o1 is now a signal about Dm; and agents can make an inference about
Pr[Dm = 1]: Dene
F =
(1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) <
1
2
:
Note that F is the posterior about the party-specic ability on the mainstream policy,
after one economic failure realized at a time the party had expertise on the policy.
This history of play in periods 0 and 1 constitutes the starting point of our model of
the strategic environment in period 2 and period 3; where parties face the asymmetry that
the posterior on party D is D2 (m) = 
F < 1
2
; while A2 (m) =  >
1
2
: Intuitively, economic
failures have dented the reputation of the previously incumbent party, which now faces a
disadvantage. This ts our intuition about the status of Labour in 2010-2015.
We now model the agentsdecisions in periods 2 and 3.
For party A in period 2, the policy that is more likely to deliver a good outcome if A
wins the election is m: It is thus intuitive that party A proposes policy m: We prove below
that this is indeed the equilibrium choice, but for the time being merely assume xA2 = m. If
party A is elected, the outcome is good with probability  if Am = 1 and with probability
1    if Am = 0: Since A2 (m) = ; the expected economic outcome in period 2 voting for
party A is
 + (1  )(1  ): (14)
If party D proposes policy m; the expected economic outcome voting for party D is only
F+ (1 F )(1 ); because the beliefs about party D0s ability and competence on policy
m; and hence its likelihood of delivering a good economic outcome out of policy m in period
2 have been damaged by party D0s failure to deliver a good economic outcome out of policy
m in period 1:
If party D proposes policy e; the expected economic outcome in period 2 voting for party
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D is only (1 ); because this is a new policy in which the party has no expertise, and hence
no competence.
Thus, subtracting (1  ) from Expression 14,
 + (1  )(1  )  (1  ) = (2   1);
and if (2   1) is more than the maximum value of "t; then by choosing xD2 = e; party D
foregoes any chance of winning the period 2 election.
At the beginning of period 2, the di¤erence in posteriors A2 (m)  D2 (m) is   F . So
the di¤erence in expected payo¤ from electing A versus D if both propose m is
(  F )(2   1) =

((1  ) + (1  ))  (1  )
(1  ) + (1  )

(2   1) = (1  )(2   1)
2
(1  ) + (1  ) :
(15)
If this value is less than the maximum value of "t; then by choosing xD2 = m; party D
has a chance to win the period 2 election. So let us keep the assumption that the maximum
value of "t is 14 ; and then assume
(1  )(2   1)2
(1  ) + (1  ) 
1
4
 (2   1): (16)
For the rst inequality to hold, we need
(1  ) + (1  )   4(1  )(2   1)2  0:
Solving for ; we need
 2

;
1
32  322

14+
p
28  282 + 1  162 + 1

:
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Equivalently, solving for ; we need  <  and
 62

  1
16   8

 8 +
p
 64 + 642 + 9 + 3

;
1
16   8

8 +
p
 64 + 642 + 9  3

:
For the second inequality in Expression 16, we need
  1
2
+
1
8
:
Summarizing, both inequalities in Expression 16 together with our initial assumptions are
satised if and only if (; ) is in the set:
(
(x; y) 2

1
2
; 1
2
: y 2

max

x;
1
2
+
1
8x

;
1
32x  32x2

14x+
p
28x  28x2 + 1  16x2 + 1
)
;
(17)
graphically depicted in the following gure.
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Period 3 election. Period 3 is the last in our model, so each party maximizes its chance of
winning the current election. If party A has played xA2 = m in period 2 (as assumed), then
regardless of the electoral and economic outcome in period 2, now in period 3, if xA3 = m;
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the expected outcome if A wins is A3 (m) + (1   A3 (m))(1   ) whereas if xA3 = e; the
economic outcome is good with probability only 1  : Since, for any A3 (m) > 0;
A3 (m) + (1  A3 (m))(1  ) > 1  ;
the best response for party A is to play xA3 = x
A
2 = m:
By a similar logic, party D also chooses xD3 = x
D
2 : Specically:
1. If xD2 = m; then exactly as in the case of party A; if D switches to x
D
3 = e it has
no expertise, and the expected economic outcome if it wins is only 1   , whereas
sticking to xD3 = x
D
2 = m; the expected economic outcome if it wins is 
D
3 (m) + (1 
D3 (m))(1  ) > 1  : So if xD2 = m; then xD3 = m:
2. If xD2 = e; then the expected economic outcome if D wins given x
D
3 = e; now that D
has accumulated expertise in policy e, is D3 (e)+ (1 D3 (e))(1 ) = 12 ; whereas if it
returns to m it is D3 (m)+
 
1  D3 (m)

(1  ) = F+ (1  F )(1  ) < 1
2
: Hence
if xD2 = e; then x
D
3 = e:
So, if in periods 2 and 3, party D chooses (xD2 ; x
D
3 ) = (e; e); then subject to party D
winning the period 3 election, the expected economic outcome is 1
2
: On the other hand,
if party D chooses (xD2 ; x
D
3 ) = (m;m) and wins the period 3 election, then the expected
economic outcome depends on D3 (m); which itself depends on the realization of the election
and the economy in period 2. In particular,
1. If xD2 = m and W2 = A, then 
D
3 (m) = 
D
2 (m) = 
F ; because period 2 did not reveal
any further information about Dm:
2. If xD2 = m, W2 = D, and the economic outcome is bad, the posterior is 
D
3 (m) = 
FF ;
where the posterior following two failures FF is dened by
FF  
F (1  )
F (1  ) + (1  F ) =
(1  )2
(1  )2 + (1  )2
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3. If xD2 = m; W2 = D, and the economic outcome is good, the posterior is back to
D3 (m) = :
Period 2 election.
If xD2 = m, from Expression 15, the probability that D wins in period 2 is
Pr

"t <   (1  )(2   1)
2
(1  ) + (1  )

=
1
2
  2(1  )(2   1)
2
(1  ) + (1  ) ; (18)
which is positive by assumption.
Subject to xD2 = m and W2 = D, the probability that the outcome is good (o2 = 1) is
F + (1  F )(1  ); or equivalently, in primitives,
(1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) +

1  (1  )
(1  ) + (1  )

(1  ) = (1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) ; (19)
and that the outcome is bad is
1  (1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) =
2   (2   1)
(1  ) + (1  ) : (20)
So at the beginning of period 2, if party D chooses xD2 = m; from Expressions 18, 19 and
20, party D can anticipate that
Pr[D3 (m) = 
FF ] =

1
2
  2(1  )(2   1)
2
(1  ) + (1  )

2   (2   1)
(1  ) + (1  )

;
Pr[D3 (m) = 
F ] =
1
2
+
2(1  )(2   1)2
(1  ) + (1  ) ; and
Pr[D3 (m) = ] =

1
2
  2(1  )(2   1)
2
(1  ) + (1  )

(1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) :
Subject to xD2 = m and W2 = A, Pr

A3 (m) = 
F

= (1   ) + (1   ) and
Pr

A3 (m) = 
G

=  + (1   )(1   ); where G is the posterior that follows one good
outcome, dened by
G  
 + (1  )(1  ) > :
Back to period 3 election.
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Note
G   F = 


 + (1  )(1  )  
1  
(1  ) + (1  )

= 
2   2   1 + 
(  2 + )(2 + 1    )
So subject to xD2 = x
A
2 = x
D
3 = x
A
3 = m, the posteriors 
D
3 (m) and 
A
3 (m); and their net
di¤erence are
D3 (m) 
A
3 (m) 
A
3 (m)  D3 (m) with probability
FF  (1 )(2 1)
 2+2 2

1
4
  (1 )(2 1)2
(1 )+(1 )

2 (2 1)
(1 )+(1 )

 P1
  0 2

1
4
  (1 )(2 1)2
(1 )+(1 )

(1 )
(1 )+(1 )  P2
F F 0

1
2
+ 2(1 )(2 1)
2
(1 )+(1 )

((1  ) + (1  ))  P3
F G (1 )(2 1)
( 2+)(2+1  )

1
2
+ 2(1 )(2 1)
2
(1 )+(1 )

( + (1  )(1  ))  P4
;
where the rst row corresponds to the event in whichW2 = D and o2 = 0; the second row to
W2 = D and o2 = 1; the third to W2 = A and o2 = 0 and the fourth to W2 = A and o2 = 1:
Now, the di¤erence in expected outcomes in voting for A over D is
 
A3 (m)  D3 (m)

(2   1) :
So the probability that party D wins in period 3, subject to xD2 = m, is as follows
P1 Pr
"
"t <   (1  ) (2   1)
2
  2+ 2
#
+ (P2 + P3)
1
2
(21)
+ P4 Pr

"t <    (1  ) (2   1)
(  2 + )(2 + 1    )

:
If instead xD2 = x
D
3 = e, then 
D
3 (e) =
1
2
: If xD2 = e; party A wins the period 2 election
with certainty (by assumption on the parameter range), and the posterior about party A is
A3 (m) = 
F with probability (1   ) + (1   ) and G > , with probability  + (1  
)(1  ):
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So, with probability (1  ) + (1  ); A3 (m)  D3 (e) is equal to
F   1
2
=
1
2
  (1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) =
1
2
  
(1  ) + (1  ) < 0
which translates into a di¤erence in expected economic outcome of
1
2
(  ) (2   1)
(1  ) + (1  ) < 0:
Whereas, with probability  + (1  )(1  ); A3 (m)  D3 (e) is equal to
G   1
2
=
1
2
 +   1
 + (1  )(1  )
which translates into a di¤erence in expected economic outcome equal to
1
2
( +   1) (2   1)
 + (1  )(1  ) ;
So, subject to xD2 = x
D
3 = e and x
A
2 = x
A
3 = m; the probability that D wins in period 3,
is
(+(1 )(1 )) Pr

"t <  (+    1)(2   1)
2(2 + 1    )

+((1 )+(1 )) Pr

"t <
(   )(2   1)
2   2(2   1)

:
(22)
So the period 3 gain for D from Tactical Extremism is Expression 22 minus Expression
21. This is equal to
(2   1)    
 +   2: (23)
Parameters for which TE holds.
Comparing the gain (2   1)  
+ 2 in period 3 (Expression 23), with the loss in prob-
ability of election in period 2, 1
2
  2(1 )(2 1)2
(1 )+(1 ) (Expression 18), and always under the
parameter range given by Expression 12 and Expression 11, we obtain that
(2   1)    
 +   2  

1
2
  2(1  )(2   1)
2
(1  ) + (1  )

 0
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if and only if
  1
32  322 + 8

18+
p
28  282 + 9  162 + 3

: (24)
From the characterization of the set of parameters in Expression 17, and from Inequality
24, the following result holds.
Claim 3 The set of parameters (; ) for which in equilibrium we observe Tactical Extrem-
ism is
TE 
8<:(; ) 2

1
2
; 1
2
:  2
0@ 132 322+8 18+p28  282 + 9  162 + 3 ;
1
32 322

14+
p
28  282 + 1  162 + 1

1A9=; :
The set TE   1
2
; 1
2
is depicted in the following graph.
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:
Recall that the upper constraint on ,   1
32 322

14+
p
28  282 + 1  162 + 1

;
is the restriction that guarantees that party D has some probability of winning the period
2 election by choosing xD2 = m: The parameter range of substantive interest is such that
this constraint is satised; if it is not satised (for (; ) above the line), in equilibrium we
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also observe TE, but due to more trivial reasons: in such region, since party D has zero
probability of winning the period 2 election anyway, TE has no cost, and it follows that
party D chooses extremism to best prepare for period 3.
Therefore, within the parameter range of interest, the qualitative result we have obtained
across all models holds here as well: TE occurs in equilibrium if and only if there is su¢ cient
uncertainty about the moderate policy ( is su¢ ciently low, given ), and if competence
matters enough ( su¢ ciently high, given ).
5.3. An Innite Horizon
We present an innite horizon extension, with an election at every period t 2 N:We nd that
if parties are su¢ ciently patient, the main result of our theory is robust in this extension:
TE obtains if competence is su¢ ciently important, and beliefs that the mainstream policy
is correct are relatively low.
Setup. Consider a model of electoral competition with an innite horizon, two purely
o¢ ce-motivated parties and one strategic representative voter. In each period t 2 f1; 2; ::::g,
parties A and D compete in an election. The policy space is X = fe;mg. Parties seek to
maximize the discounted sum of the probabilities of being elected over the whole horizon.
In each period t, before the election, each party j 2 fA;Dg simultaneously announces a
platform xjt 2 X; which is the policy that the party will implement in period t if it wins o¢ ce.
Let xt  (xAt ; xDt ) and xjt = (xj1; xj2; :::; xjt) and let xt = (x1; x2; :::; xt): The voter observes xt
and votes for either A or D or abstains: The winning party Wt 2 fA;Dg implements xwt ;
which is equal to its announced policy xWtt . The set of states of Nature is  = fe;mg; and
t 2  is the state of Nature in period t: For each t 2 N; at the beginning of period t the
state t is unknown. However, all agents know that the state is more likely to be m; and has
some inertia, specically, they know that
t  Pr[t = mjt 1] =
8<: H if t 1 = mL if t 1 = e (25)
66
with H > L > 12 .
26 We refer to m as the mainstream platform because all agents agree
that in any period, m is the policy most likely to be correct. We assume 1 2 fL; Hg :27
Let ot 2 f0; 1g denote the economic outcome in period t: The probability of a good
outcome is 1 if the implemented policy xt matches the state t; and it is 0 otherwise.
We model policy-specic valence (or competence) by assuming that whether the govern-
ment implements its chosen policy competently a¤ects the utility of the voter. Competence
is policy specic and it is a function of current and previous platforms, because acquiring
competence on a given policy requires time to build the necessary expertise. As in our
two-period model, we introduce an ex-ante asymmetry by assuming that party A enjoys
a competency advantage in period 1 on the mainstream platform, implicitly due to policy
choices made before the game starts in period 1. In all subsequent periods, we assume that
party j has competence on any given platform if it has proposed this platform for the last
two periods, and for at least as many consecutive periods as the other party.
For any policy pair (y; z) 2 fe;mg2, let cjt((y; z)) denote the competence of party j in
period t; conditional on platform pair (xAt ; x
D
t ) = (y; z): Note that the value of c
j
t((y; z)) also
depends on the past platforms xt 1; as follows. Introduce the notation xA0 = x
D
0 = x
A
 1 = m
and xD 1 = ;: Then, with this notation, for each period t 2 N; for each policy pair (y; z) 2
fe;mg2 and for each party j 2 fA;Dg; cjt((y; z)) = c if xjt 1 = xjt and there does not exist
 2 f 1; 0; 1; 2; :::tg such that xj 6= xjt and x jk = xjt for any k 2 f;  + 1; :::; tg: Otherwise,
cjt((y; z)) = 0:
Notice that under this formulation of the policy-specic valence, a party j that has gained
an advantage on any given policy x 2 fe;mg in period t, relinquishes such advantage by
ip-opping to xjt+1 = x
0 6= x. Even if party j returns to xjt+2 = x; the ip-op would
have caused j to lose its advantage, and party j would have no policy-specic valence on x
in period t + 2: To regain a policy-specic valence advantage on x; party j would need to
26Assuming that L > 12 makes it harder for TE to obtain as it implies that policy m is always more likely
to generate a good outcome than policy e.
27We can consider instead a model with a constant state , in which voters hold the following (non-
Bayesian) beliefs: they believe that Pr[ = m] = H after any period in which the mainstream policy
delivers a good outcome (or the extreme policy delivers a bad one) and Pr[ = m] = L after the mainstream
policy delivers a bad outcome (or the extreme policy delivers a good one). The two models yield the exact
same results.
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again choose xt+3 = x and to persevere on choosing policy x for at least as many consecutive
periods as party  j:
For each t 2 N; let kt 2 fA;D;?g denote the party that enjoys a net competence
advantage in period t; given xt; (and given xt 1). That is, kt = j if c
j
t(xt)  c jt (xt) = c:
We also model non-policy valence (or charisma) by assuming that "t represents the
voters idiosyncratic preference for party A in period t. This shock captures non-policy
attributes that may a¤ect the voters preferences. For each period t 2 f1; 2; :::g; "t is drawn
independently from a uniform distribution over
 1
4
; 1
4

. Its draw is the voters private
information.
Timing. At the beginning of period t 2 f1; 2; :::g, t and "t are unknown to all players.
Parties choose platforms xAt 2 fe;mg and xDt 2 fe;mg simultaneously. Then all players
observe xt = (xAt ; x
D
t ) and "t and after this observation, the voter chooses a vote in fA;D; ;g.
If the voter chooses a party j 2 fA;Bg; then this party wins, while if the voter abstains
(;) ; the winning party is randomly chosen with equal probability. The winning party j
implements its policy so that xwt = x
j
t . The economic outcome ot is realized and observed
by all players. The rules of the game, and parameters (H ; L; c) are common knowledge.
At the beginning of each period t there is a state of the game
t  (xt 1; kt 1; t 1) ;
which describes partiesplatform choices and net competence advantage, and the state of
Nature, at the end of the previous period. Note that xt 1 and kt 1 are directly observed by
all agents; and at the end of period t 1; t 1 can be inferred by Bayesian updating from the
implemented policy xwt 1 and the economic outcome ot 1 : namely, ot 1 = 1 =) t 1 = xwt 1
and ot 1 = 0 =) t 1 = fe;mgnfxwt 1g: Hence, at the beginning of period t; all agents share
the same degenerate (and correct) belief about the state (of the game) t:
Let   fe;mg2fA;D;?gfe;mg denote the set of states of the game, and let  2 
denote an arbitrary state of the game. The state t 2  determines updated beliefs about
t (from t 1), and it also determines the competencies (cAt (xt); c
D
t (xt)), as a function of xt 1
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and kt 1; as indicated in the following Table 26:
(xAt ; x
D
t ) 
xAt 1; x
D
t 1; kt 1

(e; e) (e;m) (m; e) (m;m)
(e; e; A) (c; 0) (c; 0) (0; c) (0; 0)
(e; e;?) (c; c) (c; 0) (0; c) (0; 0)
(e; e;D) (0; c) (c; 0) (0; c) (0; 0)
(e;m; ) (c; 0) (c; c) (0; 0) (0; c)
(m; e; ) (0; c) (0; 0) (c; c) (c; 0)
(m;m;A) (0; 0) (0; c) (c; 0) (c; 0)
(m;m;?) (0; 0) (0; c) (c; 0) (c; c)
(m;m;D) (0; 0) (0; c) (c; 0) (0; c)
(26)
One feature emphasized by Table 26 is that if xAt 1 6= xDt 1 then kt 1 is not needed to determine
(cAt (xt); c
D
t (xt)):
Utilities. Parties are purely o¢ ce motivated. They maximize the discounted sum of the
probabilities of being elected over the whole horizon, with  2 (0; 1) the discount factor. The
voter optimizes period by period, myopically. In each period t; and for each party j; the
voter calculates the expected utility that it would attain if she elects party j. This expected
utility is computed as the sum of three terms: the expected economic performance under
party j (given the voters beliefs), the policy-specic valence of party j; and the non-policy
valence of party j: The voter then optimizes for the period by voting for the party with the
highest expected utility.
Solution concept. We assume that parties are strategic and sequentially rational while in
each period the voter chooses party A if the net expected utility function for that period,
conditional on her beliefs, is non-negative and party D otherwise. Beliefs about the state
follow the rules described above. We further focus on stationary equilibria, in the sense that
we only consider equilibria where for each player, strategies in period t are solely a function
of the state and not of the whole history. This means that if in two periods t and t0 we
have t = t0 then all players play the same strategies in both periods, even if the histories
69
between the two periods di¤er.
For each party j 2 fA;Dg; let xj :   ! fe;mg denote a stationary strategy.
We will say that there is Tactical Extremism (TE) in an equilibrium, if there is at least
one state  2  along the equilibrium path, in which party j chooses the platform that is
less likely to be correct, given beliefs at such state.
We begin the analysis by considering the voters decision in any period t as a function of
the platforms
 
xAt ; x
D
t

chosen by the parties, given ct, the realization of "t; and the voters
belief about Pr[t = m]:
For each party j 2 fA;Dg; for each xjt 2 fe;mg and for each state t; let Et

ot j (xjt ; t)

denote the expectation over the economic outcome ot given that xwt = x
j
t and given state t;
where the source of uncertainty is the state t: The voter votes for D in period t if
Et

ot j (xAt ; t)

+ cAt (xt) + "t < Et

ot j (xDt ; t)

+ cDt (xt)
Given that the voter votes for D in period t if
"t < Et

ot j (xDt ; t)
  Et ot j (xAt ; t)+ cDt (xt)  cAt (xt) ; (27)
then the probability of winning for party D as a function of platform xt and the state t is
Et

ot j (xDt ; t)
  Et ot j (xAt ; t)+ cDt (xt)  cAt (xt) + 14
1
2
=
1
2
+ 2(cDt (xt)  cAt (xt)) + 2Et

ot j (xDt ; t)
  Et ot j (xAt ; t) :
Let (xA; xD) denote the partiesstrategies in an stationary equilibrium. The innitely
repeated 2-player game played by the two parties, taken the voter strategy as given, is a
constant-sum stochastic game and so that the strategy pursued by a given party will be a
maxmin strategy.
We obtain the rst preliminary result: party A always plays m:
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Lemma 7 In any stationary equilibrium of the game, party A plays xAt = m along the
equilibrium path in every period.
Proof. In any period t, the probability of winning for party A is
1
2
+ 2
 
cAt (xt)  cDt (xt)

+ 2Et

ot j (xAt ; t)
  2Et ot j (xDt ; t) ;
subject to bounds at zero and one.
Since 1
2
is a constant, without loss of generality we consider the game without it, and
normalize payo¤s so that the period payo¤ for party A is
cAt (xt)  cDt (xt) + Et

ot j (xAt ; t)
  Et ot j (xDt ; t) : (28)
Consider the lowest possible payo¤ that party A may obtain, if it plays xAt = m for every
period. Playing xAt = m for every period implies c
A
t (xt) = c and c
D
t ((m;m)) = 0 for every
t 2 N: So, for any period such that xDt = m; cAt (xt)   cDt (xt) = c and Et

ot j (xAt ; t)

=
Et

ot j (xDt ; t)

; so Payo¤ 28 is strictly positive. Further, for any period such that xDt =
e; cAt (xt)  cDt (xt) 2 f0; cg and since for any t  ;
Et [ot j (m;t)]  Et [ot j (e; t)] = 2 (2t   1) > 0;
it follows that Et

ot j (xAt ; t)

> Et

ot j (xDt ; t)

. Hence, Payo¤ 28 is strictly positive as
well.
Therefore, strategy xA() = m yields A a strictly positive payo¤ in every period.
Consider a putative equilibrium where at some time   1; for the rst time, party A
chooses platform e:28
Case 1: Assume xD = x
D
 1 = e:
Suppose party D plays xDt = m for any t > : Then c
A
 (x )   cD (x ) = cA ((e;m))  
28Recall that we use the convention that xA0 = x
D
0 = x
A
 1 = m and x
D
 1 = ;; so that k0 = A:
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cD ((e;m)) =  c and cAt (xt)  cDt (xt) 2 f c; 0g for any t > : Further, since for any t  ;
Et [ot j (e; t)]  Et [ot j (m;t)] = 2 (1  2t) < 0;
it follows
Et

ot j (xAt ; t)
  Et [ot j (m;t)]  0;
so the Payo¤ 28 is zero in period ; and weakly negative for any period after ; for any
strategy played by A: Since the game is constant sum, the equilibrium payo¤ for A must
be at most the payo¤ obtained if party D plays xDt = m for any t > : Then deviating to
xA() = m is protable.
Case 2: Assume xD 1 = m; x
D
 = e:
Suppose party D plays xDt = m for any t > : Then c
A
 (x )   cD (x ) = cA ((e; e))  
cD ((e; e)) = 0 and c
A
t (xt)  cDt (xt) 2 f c; 0g for any t >  + 1: Further, since for any t  ;
Et [ot j (e; t)]  Et [ot j (m;t)] = 2 (1  2t) < 0;
it follows
Et

ot j (xAt ; t)
  Et [ot j (m;t)]  0;
so the Payo¤ 28 is zero in period ; c   2 (2t   1) in period  + 1; and weakly negative
for any period after ; for any strategy played by A: Since the game is constant sum, the
equilibrium payo¤ for A must be at most the payo¤ obtained if party D plays xDt = m for
any t > :
Deviating to xA() = m, in period  party A obtains c + 2 (2t   1) and a strictly
positive payo¤ in every period after : Since c+ 2 (2t   1) > (c  2 (2t   1)); deviating to
xA() = m is protable.
Case 3: Assume xD 1 = e; x
D
 = m:
Suppose party D plays xDt = m for any t > : Then c
A
 (x )  cD (x ) = 0 and cAt (xt) 
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cDt (xt) 2 f c; 0g for any t > : Further, since for any t  ;
Et [ot j (e; t)]  Et [ot j (m;t)] = 2 (1  2t) < 0;
it follows
E [o j (e;  )]  E [o j (m; )] = 2 (1  2 ) < 0;
and
Et

ot j (xAt ; t)
  Et [ot j (m;t)]  0;
so the Payo¤ 28 is strictly negative in period ; and weakly negative for any period after ;
for any strategy played by A: Since the game is constant sum, the equilibrium payo¤ for A
must be at most the payo¤ obtained if party D plays xDt = m for any t > : Then deviating
to xA() = m is protable.
Case 4: Assume xD 1 = x
D
 = m.
Suppose party D plays xDt = m for any t > : Then c
A
 ((e;m))   cD ((e;m)) =  c and
cAt (xt)  cDt (xt) 2 f c; 0g for any t > : Further, since for any t  ;
Et [ot j (e; t)]  Et [ot j (m;t)] = 2 (1  2t) < 0;
it follows
E [o j (e;  )]  E [o j (m; )] = 2 (1  2 ) < 0;
and
Et

ot j (xAt ; t)
  Et [ot j (m;t)]  0 for any t > ;
so the Payo¤ 28 is strictly negative in period ; and weakly negative for any period after ;
for any strategy played by A: Since the game is constant sum, the equilibrium payo¤ for A
must be at most the payo¤ obtained if party D plays xDt = m for any t > : Then deviating
to xA() = m is protable.
For any period t 2 N; for any sequence of policy platforms and economic outcomes
((xs; os))
1
s=t, and for any period s 2 ft; t + 1; :::g, dene ps(((xs; os))1s=t) as the probability
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that party j wins in period s; given ((xs; os))1s=t; and given the voting behavior specied by
(27). Then let
V jt (((xs; os))
1
s=t) 
1X
s=t
s tps
denote the present value evaluated at period t; of the innite stream of expected period
utilities for party j in that sequence from time t onwards. Then
V  jt (((xs; os))
1
s=t) =
1X
s=t
s t (1  ps) = 1
1 + 
  V jt (((xs; os))1s=t);
and for any t; V Dt (((xs; os))
1
s=t) is equal to
1X
s=t
s t

2(cDs (xs)  cAs (xs)) + 2Es

os j (xDs ; s)
  2Es os j (xAs ; s)+ 12

;
and V At (((xs; os))
1
s=t) is equal to
1
1 + 
 
1X
s=t
s t

2(cDs (xs)  cAs (xs)) + 2Es

os j (xDs ; s)
  2Es os j (xAs ; s)+ 12

:
For any pair of stationary strategies xA and xD; for any t 2 N; for any policy xDt 2
fe;mg; and for any state t 2 ; slightly abusing notation, let V (xA; (xDt ;xD); t) denote
the expected value of V Dt (((xs; os))
1
s=t) given that party A plays strategy x
A; party D plays
xDt in period t and strategy x
D thereafter, the voter votes according to (27), and the state is
t; and let V (xA; xD; t)  V D(xA; (xD(t); xD); t) denote the special case in which D also
plays xD in period t: Note that the expectation is over the realization of ot in each period,
and the period subscript on the V disappears because xA and xD are stationary strategies
(we drop the party superscript because we do not use the analogous notation for party A).
The next proposition denes conditions for an equilibrium where TE exists, in the sense
that party D chooses xD() = e for any t with t 1 = L; even though Et [ot j (m;t)] >
Et [ot j (e; t)] :
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Proposition 6 Assume
L  1 + c
2 + c
and H  1 + (1 + )c
2 + c
then there exists a (stationary) equilibrium where A always chooses policy m along the equi-
librium path, whereas D choose platform e in any period t such that t 1 = L and platform
m in any period t such that t 1 = H .
Proof. We know, by Lemma 7, that the equilibrium strategy xA is such that xAt = m in
every period. Let 0   be the set of states that can arise if xAt = m in every period. In
particular, we have the following possible states:
0 = f(m;A;m); (m;A; e); (e; A;m); (e; A; e); (e;?;m); (e;?; e)g; where each state is de-
ned simply as (xDt 1; kt 1; t 1): Notice further that states (e; A;m) and (e;?;m); and states
(e; A; e) and (e;?; e) are payo¤ equivalent, so we can restrict the set of states further to
00  f(m;A;m); (m;A; e); (e; ;m); (e; ; e)g:
We consider each of the four states in turn. We want to sustain an equilibrium in which
xDt () = m for  2 f(m;A;m); (e; ;m)g and xDt () = e for  2 f(m;A; e); (e; ; e)g:
Case 1. State t = (m;A;m): Choosing xDt = x
D
t (t) = m; party D obtains utility
V (xA; xD; (m;A;m)) equal to
1
2
  2c+ [HV (xA; xD; (m;A;m)) + (1  H)V (xA; xD; (m;A; e))]: (29)
Deviating to xDt = e; party D obtains utility V (x
A; (e; xD); (m;A;m)) equal to
1
2
  2c+ 2 (1  2H) + [HV (xA; xD; (e; ;m)) + (1  H)V (xA; xD; (e; ; e))]:
To sustain our equilibrium, we need that
V (xA; xD; (m;A;m))  V (xA; (e; xD); (m;A;m)): (30)
Case 2. State t = (m;A; e):Deviating to xDt = m; partyD obtains V (x
A; (m;xD); (m;A; e))
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equal to
1
2
  2c+ [LV (xA; xD; (m;A;m)) + (1  L)V (xA; xD; (m;A; e))]: (31)
Choosing xDt = x
D
t (t) = e; party D obtains utility V (x
A; xD; (m;A; e)) equal to
1
2
  2c+ 2 (1  2L) + [LV (xA; xD; (e; ;m)) + (1  L)V (xA; xD; (e; ; e))]:
To sustain our equilibrium, we need that
V (xA; (m;xD); (m;A; e))  V (xA; xD; (m;A; e)): (32)
Case 3. State t = (e; ;m): Choosing xDt = xDt (t) = m; partyD obtains V (xA; xD; (e; ;m))
equal to
1
2
  2c+ [HV (xA; xD; (m;A;m)) + (1  H)V (xA; xD; (m;A; e))]:
Deviating to xDt = e; party D obtains utility V (x
A; (e; xD); (e; ;m)) equal to
1
2
+ 2 (1  2H) + [HV (xA; xD; (e; ;m)) + (1  H)V (xA; xD; (e; ; e))]: (33)
To sustain our equilibrium, we need that
V (xA; xD; (e; ;m))  V (xA; (e; xD); (e; ;m)): (34)
Case 4. State t = (e; ; e): Deviating to xDt = m; party D obtains V (xA; (m;xD); (e; ; e))
equal to
1
2
  2c+ [LV (xA; xD; (m;A;m)) + (1  L)V (xA; xD; (m;A; e))]:
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Choosing xDt = x
D
t (t) = e; party D obtains utility V (x
A; xD; (e; ; e)) equal to
1
2
+ 2 (1  2L) + [LV (xA; xD; (e; ;m)) + (1  L)V (xA; xD; (e; ; e))]: (35)
To sustain our equilibrium, we need that
V (xA; (m;xD); (e; ; e))  V (xA; xD; (e; ; e)): (36)
Notice rst that given that xD

t () = m for  2 f(m;A;m); (e; ;m)g and xDt () = e for
 2 f(m;A; e); (e; ; e)g;
V (xA; xD; (m;A;m)) = V (xA; xD; (e; ;m)) (37)
V (xA; xD; (m;A; e)) = V (xA; xD; (e; ; e))  2c (38)
V (xA; (e; xD); (m;A;m)) = V (xA; (e; xD); (e; ;m))  2c (39)
V (xA; (m;xD); (m;A; e)) = V (xA; (m;xD); (e; ; e)): (40)
We use Equality 39 to restate Condition 30 as
V (xA; xD; (m;A;m))  V (xA; (e; xD); (e; ;m))  2c: (41)
We use Equality 38 to restate Condition 32 as
V (xA; (m;xD); (m;A; e))  V (xA; xD; (e; ; e))  2c: (42)
We use Equality 37 to restate Condition 34 as
V (xA; xD; (m;A;m))  V (xA; (e; xD); (e; ;m)): (43)
We use Equality 40 to restate Condition 36 as
V (xA; (m;xD); (m;A; e))  V (xA; xD; (e; ; e)); (44)
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Notice that Condition 43 implies Condition 41, and that Condition 42 implies Condition 44.
Hence conditions 42 and 43 are necessary, and jointly su¢ cient, to sustain a TE equilibrium.
Expanding Condition 42 using Expression 31 and Expression 35, we obtain
 (1  L)V (xA; xD; (m;A; e))  2 (1  2L) +  (1  L)V (xA; xD; (e; ; e))
, 0  2 (1  2L) +  (1  L) 2c
, c  2L   1
 (1  L) :
Expanding Condition 43 using Expression 29 and Expression 33, we obtain
 2c+  (1  H)V (xA; xD; (m;A; e))  2 (1  2H) +  (1  H)V (xA; xD; (e; ; e))
, 2 (2H   1)  2c+  (1  H) 2c = 2c(1 +  (1  H))
, c  2H   1
1 +  (1  H)
Therefore, a TE equilibrium exists if and only if
c 2

2L   1
 (1  L) ;
2H   1
1 +  (1  H)

:
Equivalent conditions are
L  1 + c
2 + c
and H  1 + (1 + )c
2 + c
:
The following gure plots the maximum value of L (solid line) and the minimum one of
H (dashed) in order for this equilibrium to hold if  ' 1 :
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Intuitively, if L is too high (above 1+c2+c ), then both parties always play m; consistent
with our robust qualitative result that a TE equilibrium requires that there be su¢ cient
uncertainty that the correct policy is m : parameter L plays a similar role as  in our two
period model, namely, they have to be not too high in order for TE to hold. Equivalently,
stating the result in terms of the competence parameter c; we again obtain the same intu-
ition as in the two-period model: the importance of competence has to be su¢ ciently high,
specically c  2L 1
(1 L) ; in order for TE to hold.
If H is not su¢ ciently high (if it not above
1+(1+)c
2+c
), or, equivalently, if c is too high,
then party D always plays e: In this case, party D sacrices a probability of winning the rst
period election, for the sake of higher probabilities of victory in future elections, conforming
to our denition of a Tactical Extremism equilibrium.
Computations for equilibria for parameter ranges outside those of Proposition 6 are avail-
able from the authors.
Notice that Tactical Extremism requires parties to be patient: a party that chooses TE
incurs a short term cost in terms of foregone probability of winning the immediate election,
for a greater probability of victory in future elections; only a su¢ ciently patient party is
willing to take such a trade-o¤. Formally, the condition that L 2
 
1
2
; 1+c
2+c

can only be
satised if 1
2
 :
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Below is the list of additional references we cite in the Appendix and not in the main
Letter.
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